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ABSTRACT—A healthy system of shareholder voting is crucial for any
regime of corporate law. The proper allocation of governance power is
subject to debate, of course, but the fitness of the underlying mechanism used
to stuff the ballot boxes should concern everyone. Proponents of shareholder
power, for instance, cannot argue for greater control if the legitimacy of the
resulting tallies is suspect. And those who advocate for board deference do
so on the bedrock of authority that reliable shareholder elections supposedly
confer.
Unfortunately, our trust in the corporate franchise was forged during an
era that predates modern complexities in the way that stock ownership is now
tracked and traded. We do not trace shares, and any clear-eyed look at the
conferral of voting rights via back-end stock clearing practices is unsettling.
Evidence of the various entanglements crops up from time to time—in the
form of questionable voting outcomes or disputes about standing for
shareholder lawsuits—but the underlying problems are systemic, not
episodic. Our stock clearing system is a kludge.
This is an important moment for corporate law, however, because new
technology is approaching a state where clearing and settlement systems may
soon support traceable shares. The rise of distributed ledgers and blockchain
technology is poised to allow for specific share identification and precise
records of share provenance. This may sound like an uninteresting technical
sideshow, but as this Article will argue, the impact of traceable shares on
corporate law will be profound. It will change the structure of shareholder
lawsuits, alter the allocation of corporate governance rights, and require
lawmakers to rethink fundamental principles of shareholder responsibility
for corporate misdeeds.
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INTRODUCTION
After you buy a share of stock, what happens next? How does the
resulting settlement and transfer of your new ownership certificate take
place? For most corporate law scholars, these are especially uninteresting
questions. Front-end trading strategies and flash algorithms may be
exciting, 1 but the recessed plumbing of back-end clearing processes is not.
Most people just ignore the topic. We assume that a share of stock will
eventually “get” to its new owner—along with all the legal rights of
ownership—without worrying much about what the transfer actually entails
or the timing of when this might occur.
The primary claim of this Article, however, is that the mechanics of
back-end share transfer matter deeply to corporate law. Our current clearing
systems limit shareholder rights in ways that most owners do not completely
understand. Conversely, selling shareholders may evade responsibility for
some corporate misdeeds because it has become too difficult to link
individual sellers back to a specific share transfer. This has sometimes
resulted in the imposition of corporate-level liability under a framework that
is not entirely satisfactory because money is simply shifted from one pocket
1 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) (describing highfrequency trading algorithm strategies and market structures); Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency
Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 529–30 (2014) (evaluating legal approaches
for mitigating systemic market risk in high-frequency trading).
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(that of all current shareholders) to another (that of wronged shareholders). 2
Ex-shareholders, who may have benefitted from a transgression, are not
tracked down or held accountable in any way. 3
The central player behind the scenes is the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (DTCC). Through numerous subsidiaries, DTCC takes physical
possession of most stock certificates, serves as record owner for these shares,
and clears trades by transferring beneficial ownership electronically from
seller to buyer via bookkeeping adjustments. 4 As we will see, this approach
has played a crucial role in managing an exploding volume of stock trades
over the past five decades by avoiding a need to coordinate the handoff of
physical certificates from seller to buyer. 5
Problems arise, however, because DTCC’s warehouses of certificates
are typically held in unidentifiable “fungible bulk.” 6 This means that it is
often impossible to specify who owns any given share of stock. We do not
say that Bryce Buyer is the beneficial owner of stock certificate #123456789;
rather, Bryce owns one share from a large pool of certificates isolated and
housed by DTCC. Similarly, when Bryce sells the stock a month later, DTCC
does not link that specific share to one of the thousands purchased by other
buyers that same day. Said differently, we do not trace shares.
In many cases, this does not matter. The fiscal trade has still occurred
at a clearly defined moment and price. And beneficial shareholders, the true
economic owners of the stock, can exercise most governance rights by asking
their brokers to send corporate proxy materials and instructing these same
brokers how to vote their shares. 7
But this lack of share identification has meaningful implications for
corporate law. Shareholders must sometimes argue that they bought shares

2

See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 541 (2005); Christine Hurt, The
Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 441–42 (2008). The attorneys bringing the suit
will, of course, also take a share of any recovery, usually as part of any settlement agreement.
3 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 541–42 (“[S]ecurities litigation in this context inherently results
in a wealth transfer between two classes of public shareholders, neither of whom is necessarily
culpable. . . . [T]he beneficiaries of the fraud are . . . the selling shareholders—and they escape without
incurring any cost when liability is later imposed on their former corporation.”).
4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227,
1238–40 (2008) (describing standard custodial practices). My description here is a slight simplification,
as there may be several layers of custodians between the DTCC and the economic owner. See infra
Section I.A.
5 See infra Section I.A.
6 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1239.
7 To be sure, mistakes will sometimes occur in a way that prejudices a shareholder’s rights. See infra
notes 82–89.
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that qualify for certain legal rights—such as an appraisal claim8 or a
Securities Act Section 11 lawsuit 9—when resolution of this eligibility is
indeterminate. Delays arise between a change in economic ownership and
the transfer of the right to vote, which means that current shareholders may
not always possess franchise rights for important matters of corporate
governance. 10 And the imposition of corporate damages for certain legal
wrongs, such as fraud on the market, 11 has been criticized for effectively
requiring “innocent” shareholders—who purchase the stock after a
misrepresentation occurs—to compensate plaintiffs. 12 Untraceable selling
shareholders, who may have benefitted economically from the fraudulent
misrepresentation, evade any loss. Might it be better to trace back the shares
to those who owned the firm at the time of a misdeed and allow the injured
shareholders to seek restitution from a previous investor? To date, these
questions have remained academic because it has not been possible to make
this sort of match.
We are at a pivotal moment for corporate law, however, because backoffice technology is nearing a state where clearing systems can trace shares.13
Prevailing stock settlement processes are likely to experience a fundamental
transformation in the coming years with the rise of distributed ledger
8 Appraisal rights permit shareholders to sue, under certain circumstances, to obtain a judicially
determined fair value for their shares, subject to procedural prerequisites. In Delaware, for instance,
shareholders must perfect this right by demonstrating that their shares did not vote in favor of the
transaction that triggered appraisal rights (often a merger). Many prospective plaintiffs, especially those
who purchase shares after a voting record date, may be unable to determine whether “their shares” voted
for or against the deal. See infra Section I.C.1.b.
9 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misrepresentations in
registration statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). Initial purchasers of the stock issued under the
registration statement have clear Section 11 claims, but downstream buyers may have difficulty gaining
standing for these claims. Many courts have permitted subsequent purchasers to pursue Section 11 claims
only if the shareholders can definitively trace their shares back to the securities issued in connection with
the problematic registration statement. As we will see, this is not an easy task, and courts deny some
claims even when there is a high likelihood (though not quite 100% certainty) that a plaintiff’s shares
came from the “tainted” issuance pool. See infra Section I.C.1.a.
10 Related concerns, such as “empty voting,” are also facilitated by an inability to specifically identify
which shares belong to whom. See infra Section I.C.2. “Empty voting” typically refers to situations where
an individual who does not have an economic interest in the outcome of the election exercises voting
rights. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of
Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN.
343, 343 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006)
[hereinafter Hu & Black, New Vote Buying].
11 Fraud on the market allows shareholders to sue for corporate misrepresentations in connection
with a security trade, even when the investor did not hear of the misleading statement directly. See infra
Section III.D.
12 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 543.
13 See infra Part II.
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technology and new methods for identifying the origin and provenance of
shares. This development would present new opportunities for reforming
corporate governance and for rethinking foundational theories of corporate
and shareholder liability. To be sure, such a change remains contingent, and
new back-office paradigms are not inevitable. But revised settlement
practices seem quite promising, 14 and the era of unidentified fungible bulk
may be drawing to a close.
If this transition does occur, the legal implications of traceable shares
will be profound. Buyers and sellers could specifically identify stock in a
way that allows them to know whether marketed shares would qualify for
certain legal claims. Corporate voting processes could be streamlined to
mitigate, though not eliminate, voting pathologies. Faster transfer of
traceable shares might dramatically eliminate delays between share
exchange and the exercise of franchise rights to make corporate governance
more responsive to shareholder interests. In light of the information that
traceable shares could offer, we may even need to reexamine fundamental
principles of shareholder responsibility for corporate misdeeds.
This Article considers how the adoption of traceable shares would
impact corporate law. Part I describes our current system for clearing stock
trades and demonstrates how the failure to specifically identify shares creates
legal problems. Part II surveys recent technological developments and argues
that it may soon be possible to reform clearing systems in a way that replaces
unidentified fungible bulk with traceable shares. Part III considers what this
will mean for several key features of corporate law and offers normative
suggestions for responding to these developments. A brief conclusion
summarizes the Article.
I.

UNIDENTIFIED FUNGIBLE BULK

Our mental model of corporate law envisions a stable body of
shareholders who receive statements outlining the key issues on a
forthcoming ballot, muster the information necessary to make sound
decisions, and eventually cast their votes by proxy or at a shareholder
meeting. In actuality, however, we do not live in such a stable world.
There are at least two fundamental and related features of our current
system for clearing stock trades that explain this break between our
perception and reality: ownership specification and the timing of rights
transfers. Settlement and clearing procedures for stock trades have become
complex—to the point where it is often impossible to specify who owns any
given share of stock. And after the shares trade, delays can still persist
14

See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
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between a change in economic ownership and the transfer of some legal
rights, including the right to vote. Taken together, these developments have
led to intractable difficulties in corporate law. But first, consider some brief
history.
A. A Brief History of Stock Settlement and Clearing Practices
In the early and mid-1900s, when corporate law lingered in a formative
state, investors lived in a paper world. Numbered stock certificates were
stashed in private file cabinets, or perhaps broker storerooms, and passed
from seller to buyer like the deed to a house or title to a car. 15 But a share of
stock can trade hands much more frequently than a used automobile, and by
the 1960s the system was snowed under. 16 There was simply too much
trading volume. During the height of this paperwork crisis, traders closed the
stock markets every Wednesday just so the brokers could inspect the unruly
piles of certificates for authenticity, organize them for distribution, and route
them to their new owners. 17 Many brokers could not keep up and closed their
doors. 18 The United States Attorney General, in a 1971 Senate hearing,
estimated that organized criminals had taken advantage of the chaos to steal
more than $400 million in securities. 19
This paperwork crisis would not do, and eventually Congress directed
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to clear the logjam. 20 The
agency, working with Wall Street brokers, settled on a fix: share
immobilization. 21 A central entity emerged to replace the network of
15 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1237; Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The
Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 201 (2000).
16 Wells, supra note 15, at 201. Two other requirements exacerbated the problem: (1) sellers had to
notarize their certificates and (2) buyers had to present this evidence of sale to a firm’s transfer agent to
become the new owner of record. Moreover, certificates designating more than 100 shares were
uncommon, meaning that large purchases would often require numerous certificates to be processed. Id.
17 See WILLIAM T. DENTZER, JR., THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY: DTC’S FORMATIVE YEARS
AND CREATION OF THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (DTCC) 1–2 (2008);
FINRA Staff, When Paper Paralyzed Wall Street: Remembering the 1960s Paperwork Crisis, FINRA
(Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.finra.org/investors/when-paper-paralyzed-wall-street-remembering-1960spaperwork-crisis [https://perma.cc/EL2Y-NPBB] (describing the Wednesday closures and broker failures
due to the paperwork confusion); History of New York Stock Exchange Holidays, NYSE.COM (Jan.
2011),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/armstrongeconomics-wp/2013/07/NYSE-Closings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DLP-E54K] (describing periodic closings due to “back office work load” and
Wednesday closings from June to December of 1968).
18 See Wells, supra note 15, at 193 (estimating that about one-sixth of brokerage firms went out of
business during this period).
19 See Marjorie Hunter, Big Board Too Busy to Stop 1968–69 Thefts: Haack Tells Senate of ‘Near
Crisis’ in Heavy Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1971, at 53.
20 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015)
(describing the pressure from Congress); Wells, supra note 15, at 208–09 (describing the role of the SEC).
21 See, e.g., Dell, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1–2.
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messengers scurrying across the back alleys of New York. Over time, this
organization, now known as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC), 22 began to serve as the permanent record owner for a majority of
shares. 23 Secure DTCC warehouses hold certificates, physical or virtual, and
the ownership name on each share no longer changes with every sale. 24
Similarly, a corporation will not adjust its official stockholder lists to reflect
routine trades; the same record holder persists as the formal owner of the
stock. Rather, the clearinghouse transfers beneficial ownership electronically
from seller to buyer via bookkeeping adjustments. 25
Individual investors do not maintain accounts with DTCC, so another
layer of intermediaries is needed to make this system work. Banks and
brokerage firms serve this role, acting as custodians between DTCC and the
principal investors. 26 While they both play similar bridging roles, banks and
brokerage firms typically serve different types of clients and may have
somewhat different business models.
Bank custodians work primarily with large institutional investors, such
as university endowments, insurance companies, and mutual funds. 27 Each
bank keeps a direct account with DTCC, but DTCC does not concern itself
with how shares are allocated among the bank’s various clients. For example,
DTCC might record and track the total number of shares owned through The
Bank of New York Mellon, State Street, JP Morgan Chase, and Citigroup
(four behemoths of custodial banking), along with dozens of other smaller
custodian banks. But DTCC keeps no information about how the 70 million
shares of, say, Starbucks stock that are held in custody by JP Morgan Chase
should be allocated between the New York Life Insurance Company, the
Harvard endowment, T. Rowe Price, and numerous other institutional
investors that might trade through JP Morgan Chase. The banks will maintain
these records, of course, and they will work with their clients to determine
how to disseminate important information and how to exercise governance
rights, such as the right to vote. In some cases, the largest custodian banks

22 The DTCC actually provides a broader range of settlement and clearing activities; most stock
transfers are handled by subsidiaries: the Depository Trust Company (DTC) and Cede & Company
(Cede). See The Depository Trust Company (DTC), DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/about/
businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc.aspx [https://perma.cc/4Y84-B52M].
23 For public firms, as much as 70%–80% of shares are estimated to be held through the DTCC and
other nominees. See Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 285, 315 (1999).
24 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1238–40.
25 Id. at 1239.
26 Id. at 1238–40.
27 Id. at 1238.
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will also perform these same services for smaller custodian banks—meaning
that there can be several nested layers of intermediation. 28
What happens if Harvard decides to sell its stake in Starbucks? The
endowment manager notifies its custodian bank, who may then help execute
the trade. 29 The custodian bank will usually benchmark the economic effect
of the sale immediately, but it will take longer to work everything through
the back-end plumbing of clearing and settlement. 30 If another client of the
custodian bank happens to take the other side of the trade, then DTCC, in
theory, need not even be aware of the exchange. The bank might just adjust
its records to show that Harvard no longer owns the stock and that a different
client is now beneficial owner. Offsetting adjustments are also required, of
course, to account for the transfer of cash from buyer to seller. 31 In many
cases, however, the buyer (or buyers, if the shares are sold in multiple blocks)
and the seller will be represented by different brokers or bank custodians. If
so, DTCC will need to record a bookkeeping adjustment to reduce the shares
allocated to Harvard’s bank custodian and increase the shares allocated to
these other custodians. 32 Note, however, that DTCC persists as record holder
of the shares throughout this process and that no specific shares are identified
as “the ones” being traded. Starbucks might not even realize that a large trade
has occurred.
Brokerage firms, in contrast to custodian banks, tend to work with
hedge funds, smaller retail customers, and individual investors. 33 Brokers
may offer some different services, but their clearing process does not differ
in a meaningful way from that of custodian banks. A brokerage firm
maintains an account with the DTCC, processes stock trades on a client’s
behalf, preserves records of the shares bought and sold by clients, and works
28

Id. at 1239.
In addition to facilitating trading markets, banks typically perform a variety of additional services
for clients, including settlement and asset safekeeping. Many banks also have a robust securities-lending
business, where stock is loaned to outside parties (for a variety of purposes, inducing short-selling
transactions) and the resulting fees are shared between the custodian bank and the client whose shares are
loaned out. Id.
30 Standards have converged recently on a settlement norm of T+2, meaning that everything should
be settled and cleared by an average of two days after the trade. There is a push to shorten this time to
T+1. Synchronous clearing might be described as the holy grail of exchange. See Pete Chandler, T+2 Is
Here, FINRA (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.finra.org/investors/highlights/t-plus-two-is-here [https://
perma.cc/X8D5-9EXC].
31 For example, if the buyer and seller of the stock both trade with the same custodian, then the bank
might increase the seller’s cash account and decrease the buyer’s cash account. If the buyer and seller use
different custodians, then the custodian for the seller will increase the seller’s cash account and the
custodian for the buyer will decrease the buyer’s cash account.
32 This is a slight simplification due to the possibility of netting. See infra note 188 and accompanying
text.
33 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1240.
29
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with the DTCC to adjust the broker’s own DTCC account to reflect top-level
changes in the number of shares held by clients. 34 Again, however, the shares
remain isolated in unidentified fungible bulk.
The creation of the DTCC and the elimination of physical certificate
transfer have, on the whole, been a welcome development. Indeed, it is
impossible to imagine how the old system could support the roughly 5
million trades that occur each day on the New York Stock Exchange. 35 But
the use of intermediate agents greatly complicates the mechanisms that must
now be used to convey the vote and other important legal rights to beneficial
shareholders.
B. Ownership and Voting Rights
Corporate law did not respond to the rise of fungible bulk shareholding
by altering its doctrines to provide direct legal rights to beneficial owners. In
Delaware, for instance, the record holder persists as registered owner of the
stock on a corporation’s books and retains the formal right to cast votes. 36
Any downstream custodial relationship between banks, brokers, and clients
is treated as a matter of agency and not a primary concern for Delaware
corporate law. 37 If mistakes arise from misunderstandings between beneficial
owners and their brokers, then it is up to the private parties to sort out the
problems; Delaware courts will not step in to make things right through
equitable adjustments. 38 This is not because Delaware lawmakers are
unaware of the DTCC framework, of course, but rather because they have
elected to prioritize the certainty provided by a firm’s absolute reliance on
its formal list of record stockholders. 39
For many corporations, this means that a DTCC subsidiary named Cede
& Company is listed as the record holder for a vast majority of stock. Yet
Cede does not make substantive decisions about how to cast votes to elect
directors or approve merger transactions. Rather, a complex series of events
will typically occur to shift voting rights to the distributed beneficial

34

Id. at 1239–40.
For recent data about daily trading volumes on the NYSE, see NYSE Group Volume in All Stocks
Traded: 2010–Current, NYXDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_
edition.asp?mode=table&key=3320&category=3 [https://perma.cc/3TTC-M7PV].
36 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2006) (describing who gets to vote); id. § 262(a)
(noting that in the appraisal context “the word ‘stockholder’ means a holder of record of stock in a
corporation”).
37 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. July 30,
2015) (describing the evolution of Delaware’s formal treatment of shareholders).
38 Id. at *10–11.
39 Id. at *17–18.
35
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shareholders who should actually have the legal and economic right to weigh
in on matters of corporate governance.
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have described this process
and its flaws in a seminal article on corporate voting, 40 so I will only
summarize the key steps here. A firm preparing for an upcoming vote will
contact DTCC to obtain the list of banks and brokers who hold shares as
custodians for beneficial owners. The firm will then ask each of these
custodians to provide the next level of information about who actually owns
the stock, so that the corporation can prepare proxy materials related to the
vote. 41 This can take some time because there may be several layers of
custodial ownership and the banks will need to obtain data from the very
bottom level. 42 The firm will then provide each custodian with copies of the
proxy materials for distribution to beneficial owners. 43
How are votes actually cast if Cede retains the formal right, as record
holder, to the franchise? Cede will execute a global proxy that allows its
account holders, the custodian banks and brokers, to cast Cede’s votes in
proportion to their total allocation. 44 If JP Morgan Chase reports clients with
25% of the shares, for example, then Cede will send that bank a proxy
allowing it to cast a quarter of the firm’s votes. The custodians may then do
the same thing for individual clients (moving down through the layers as
necessary) and fragment these proxy rights even further. Granted this proxy,
the beneficial holders can then cast their votes as they wish. Alternatively,
the banks and brokers might just ask beneficial shareholders to supply them
with timely voting instructions rather than execute a second proxy. 45 Many
custodians seem to opt for the latter approach, aggregating the instructions

40

Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1243–48.
For annual elections, this will typically include an annual report describing the firm’s recent
performance, a proxy statement describing the key issues on the ballot, and instructions or materials (such
as proxy card) for the actual casting of votes. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 10.3, at
246–47 (2d ed. 2009).
42 One sign of the imprecision raised by this framework is that the total number of shares reported
up through the banks may not always match the corporation’s records for the total number of shares issued
and outstanding. Any discrepancies may remain unreconciled at this point in the process. See Kahan &
Rock, supra note 4, at 1243–44.
43 Most of these communication efforts with shareholders are outsourced to third-party specialists.
Moreover, the SEC adopted “e-proxy” or “notice and access” rules in 2007 to allow firms to use e-mail
and the internet for delivering these materials to willing shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2018).
44 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1247.
45 Id. The exact requirements are codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b).
41
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and then casting these votes with the firm. 46 As the votes arrive, the firm can
then verify proxies, tabulate votes, and report the final results. 47
This is not an instantaneous process, and the need to gather and transmit
information back and forth between multiple parties presents a fundamental
timing concern: how to assign and freeze voting rights in an ever-churning
river of stock trades. Large companies have vast trading volumes. 48 In the
time that it takes to send information and collect responses, the pool of
beneficial owners can change significantly, and the process would need to
begin anew. How can we ever pause events long enough to locate the current
beneficial owners, send the ballot, deliberate, and cast votes through the
distributed mechanisms that are required in a regime of untraceable shares?
Corporate law finesses this problem by establishing a bright-line
“record date” when franchise rights attach to current owners—even if these
owners choose to sell their shares before the date of the actual vote. 49 This
gives the firm time to distribute information and process the votes, though it
weakens the incentives to participate for some shareholders who no longer
own the shares and may not care about the voting matter. Starbucks, for
instance, might designate a record date thirty days before its annual
shareholder meeting. If so, an investor who buys stock after this T-30 date
cannot normally vote the late-purchased stock. 50 Corporate law takes the
same “snapshot” approach with dividends. 51 Shareholders on the record date
will eventually receive the payments, and the shares trade “ex dividend,”
46

Id.
Again, it is common for firms to outsource the actual processing and tabulation of votes to a thirdparty provider. For contested matters, such as director election contests, an independent inspector may
also be retained to supervise the entire process. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 32
(Del. Ch. 2016).
48 On the very busiest days, for example, over 50 million shares of Apple stock are traded. See Apple
Inc.
Common
Stock
Historical
Stock
Prices,
NASDAQ
(June
11,
2018),
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/historical.
49 Delaware General Corporate Law is illustrative. Under § 213, a record date “not [] more than 60
nor less than 10 days before the date of such meeting” establishes the roster of eligible voters. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (West 2006).
50 The selling shareholder will retain voting rights, in this example, and it is possible for the buying
shareholder to make special arrangements with the selling shareholder to obtain a voting proxy that allows
the later shareholder to cast the votes. This is generally understood to be uncommon. See, e.g., George S.
Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1652 n.113 (2011).
51 More specifically, a firm will process dividends through a series of chronological steps. First, the
board will approve an upcoming dividend. Second, the firm will announce the dividend and state that it
will be paid to all shareholders who hold the stock on a given future date (the record date). Shares will
begin to trade without dividend rights (“ex dividend”) a couple of days before the record date. Typically,
the share price will drop on this date by the amount of the forthcoming dividend. Finally, the firm will
distribute the dividend to all entitled shareholders, typically a week or so after the record date. For a more
detailed discussion of this process, see RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE § 16.2, at 392–93 (10th ed. 2011).
47
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long before any checks are cut. 52 This system seems to work fine for
economic matters; share prices simply drop on the record date to reflect the
severance of a forthcoming dividend payment from the stock. But delays
between the vesting of voting rights on the record date and the time of the
actual vote at the shareholder meeting—along with the lack of precision
introduced by unidentified fungible bulk—can create more serious concerns.
Which brings us to the final question of this Part—What’s wrong with
untraceable shares?
C. What’s Wrong with Untraceable Shares?
Untraceable shares present varying and consequential problems in
corporate law. Among other things, the inability to specifically identify the
owner of a share can affect a beneficial owner’s legal rights, foster
illegitimate voting, and hinder efforts at corporate governance reform.
1. Legal Rights Requiring Share Identification
Many legal rights—such as the ability to collect dividends, sell shares,
or file a shareholder derivative lawsuit—do not require share identification.
It may be important to establish that you own some shares of a corporation
to take these actions, but it does not matter which shares you own. Any
certificate will do. On the other hand, some legal rights do invoke share
identification requirements, and these situations can lead to intractable
problems in a world of fungible bulk.
a. Section 11 claims
The most clear-cut example of the identification problem involves
lawsuits filed under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities
Act”). 53 Section 11 imposes liability when shares are sold pursuant to a
registration statement that contains materially misleading statements or
omissions. 54 Its purpose is to ensure the accuracy and integrity of registration
filings, often by imposing hefty sanctions for misdeeds. 55 The issuing firm is
held strictly liable under Section 11, while a cluster of other possible

52

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
54 Id. § 77k(a).
55 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11
Liability, and Prospects for Regulatory Reform, 41 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2015) (“Section 11 liability is the
source of many of the largest class action securities recoveries in history, and . . . can serve as the most
plaintiff-friendly provision of the federal securities laws.” (footnote omitted)). In part, this is true because
plaintiffs do not need to establish scienter or intent on the part of the defendants. See In re Morgan Stanley
Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the mental state required for liability).
53
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defendants—including directors, accountants, and underwriters—can also
be held liable under various negligence standards. 56
Section 11 lawsuits can grow complicated, however, when it becomes
necessary to determine which shareholders may assert a claim or join a class
action lawsuit. The language of the statute most clearly protects initial
purchasers who might be expected to rely on the registration statement, either
explicitly or constructively, when buying stock directly from the issuing
firm. 57 These buyers have clear standing to bring a Section 11 claim when
something goes awry. 58
Jurisdictions are split, however, on whether secondary market
purchasers, who transact after the initial issuance, can bring or join claims
under Section 11, 59 and the U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in on the
topic. Early appellate decisions rejected the position that all subsequent
secondary market buyers had standing. 60 A few courts still insist that
downstream buyers may never assert a Section 11 claim, 61 but this is a
minority view. 62 The more common approach is to allow secondary market
claims if plaintiffs can “trace” their stock back to the specific shares that
56 The precise test for liability depends on the nature of the misrepresentation and the identity of the
defendant. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7:4
(7th ed., 2016 rev. vol.) (analyzing the various standards of liability). Many defendants (though not the
issuer) will also possess a due diligence defense to liability. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 682–703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (assessing liability standards and the availability of a due diligence
defense for various types of defendants); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549–50 (2006).
57 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“In case any part of the registration statement . . . contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that
at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in
any court of competent jurisdiction, sue [for damages].”).
58 See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 5.
59 See In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1998) (“Courts
are split as to the definition of potential plaintiffs who may bring claims under Section 11.”); Grundfest,
supra note 55, at 5, 41–42, 41 n.237 (describing the split, including an apparent internal conflict within
the Third Circuit).
60 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271–73 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[A]n action under § 11 may
be maintained only by one who comes within a narrow class of persons, i.e. those who purchase securities
that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
61 See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If plaintiffs’ shares were
purchased in the secondary market, they would not be linked to a registration statement filed during the
class period, and the § 11 claim would fail.”); Summit, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (“Section 11 is applicable
only to shareholders who acquired their stock in the IPO.”); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., No. 96 CIV.
3610, 1997 WL 576023, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing for a
Section 11 claim because they did not allege that they purchased the securities in the initial issuance).
62 See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 41–42, 41 n.237. Numerous federal circuit courts, including the
Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, do not impose an original purchaser requirement. Id.
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were issued in connection with the tainted registration statement.63 The logic
seems to be that if the shares can be linked to the offending registration filing,
then a Section 11 claim should not be severed, under the plain language of
the statute, simply because there has been a transfer of ownership. 64 For
example, if the only source of shares on a secondary market comes from a
single public offering, then downstream buyers can trace their shares to this
primary issuance and bring a Section 11 claim in most jurisdictions. There is
no other way they could have obtained the shares. But it is not always so
easy to demonstrate such pristine provenance.65
What happens if a court cannot be 100 percent certain that a given
plaintiff’s shares were sold via the tainted registration statement? In Krim v.
pcOrder.com, for example, several plaintiffs filed a Section 11 claim
alleging that pcOrder had conducted an initial public offering with a
fraudulent registration statement. 66 For a few months after this offering, no
other shares were available for trading on the secondary markets. Eventually,
however, some shares that had not been part of the public offering (owned
by insiders at the firm) began to trickle out into the market. 67 Most of
pcOrder’s stock was isolated in fungible bulk by the DTCC, with Cede listed
as the formal record owner. 68
Consider the fate of three different plaintiffs in the case. Plaintiff A
bought 1000 shares on the secondary market soon after the IPO—when the
63

See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rejecting the defendant’s claim “that only those who purchased stock in the initial offering, and not
aftermarket purchasers, are entitled to sue under section 11”).
64 Section 11 confers standing on “any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the
time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission).” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). It does not
state that the acquisition must have been an initial acquisition from the issuer. See Krim v. pcOrder.com,
Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he plain language of [Section 11 suggests] there is no reason
to categorically exclude aftermarket purchasers, ‘so long as the security was indeed issued under that
registration statement and not another.’” (quoting DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir.
2003))). One might also assert a policy justification for permitting these secondary market claims to
provide additional deterrence against fraudulent registration statements that evade liability through the
rapid share turnover that often accompanies public offerings. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing
Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 462–73
(2000); Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in
Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 31–36 (2010).
65 See Sale, supra note 64, at 441–62 (examining the common law development of Section 11’s
tracing doctrine, describing various tracing methods, and reiterating concerns about the mismatch
between a tracing requirement and the use of fungible bulk clearing and settlement methods).
66 402 F.3d at 491–92. There were actually two public issuances: an IPO on February 26, 1999 (under
which most of the shares were issued) and a secondary public offering on December 7, 1999 (under which
fewer shares were issued). The plaintiffs alleged defects in both registration statements, and the use of
two issuances, is not critical to the disposition of the case. Id.
67 Id. at 492.
68 Id.
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only shares available for purchase were those released in the IPO.
Accordingly, plaintiff A could successfully trace his shares, as a matter of
simple logic, and gain standing for a Section 11 claim. 69 By contrast, plaintiff
C bought shares at a later date when some of the insider shares had leaked
into the market. The Fifth Circuit ruled that this plaintiff was unable to
definitively trace his shares back to the offering, because almost 10% of the
pool of available shares at the moment of purchase were not issued in
connection with the registration statement. 70 As we have seen, specific shares
are not typically identified with a transfer, so plaintiff C was unable to pierce
the fog of DTCC’s fungible bulk holdings. Even plaintiff B—who bought
stock after plaintiff A but before plaintiff C, from a pool where 99.85% of
the total shares available could be attributed to the IPO 71—was blocked from
joining the case. 72 The probability that plaintiff B bought at least 1 of his
3,000 shares from those issued via the public offering was incredibly close
to 100%, 73 but the court insisted on absolute certainty. 74
As Krim suggests, Section 11 cases frequently need to evaluate
alternative methodologies for determining whether a plaintiff has established
a sufficient link to specific shares. One notable opinion, Kirkwood v.
69

Id. Plaintiff A is Beebe in the actual case.
Id. at 492–93. Plaintiff C is Petrick in the actual case.
71 Id. at 492. Plaintiff B (who is Burke in the actual case) bought his shares earlier than plaintiff C,
and the insider shares had only just started to trickle into the public markets at the time of plaintiff B’s
purchase. Id.
72 Id. at 492–93 (describing the district court’s finding that plaintiff B lacked standing). The Fifth
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 494.
73 The plaintiff’s expert witness opined that the chance that plaintiff B obtained at least one share
from the IPO batch was equal to 1 – [(1–0.9985) ^ 3000], or greater than
99.999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
999999999999999999999999999999%. Id. at 492 n.6.
74 Id. at 496–97. The court reached this result though an interesting line of reasoning:
70

The fallacy of [the plaintiff’s] position is demonstrated with the following analogy. Taking a
United States resident at random, there is a 99.83% chance that she will be from somewhere other
than Wyoming. Does this high statistical likelihood alone, assuming for whatever reason there is
no other information available, mean that she can avail herself of diversity jurisdiction in a suit
against a Wyoming resident? Surely not.
Id. at 497. The analogy neglects the different practical concerns between demonstrating one’s citizenship
and demonstrating the precise origin of shares held in fungible bulk. With the residency question,
additional information is available; with share origin, it may not be ascertainable. Other courts have
concurred with Krim’s rejection of statistical tracing methods. See, e.g., Grand Lodge of Pa. v. Peters,
550 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1374 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (rejecting tracing based on “statistical likelihoods” that
shares can be traced to a faulty registration statement); In re Alamosa Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F.
Supp. 2d 832, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that the “mere probability that a plaintiff can trace shares
is clearly insufficient” to establish standing).
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Taylor, 75 considered four different ways of implementing a tracing
requirement. First, the direct tracing method occurs when a plaintiff can
demonstrate that she purchased the stock directly in an underwritten public
offering. 76 This method obviously offers no help for secondary market
claimants.
A second possible method, fungible mass tracing, posits that a plaintiff
shareholder maintains a proportional interest in the number of tainted shares
in the pool held in fungible bulk by DTCC. 77 For example, suppose DTCC
holds 500 shares of a firm in fungible bulk, and 500 more shares are added
under a fraudulent registration statement. A secondary market purchaser
could argue that half of her shares should qualify for a Section 11 claim under
fungible mass tracing. This approach, however, was rejected by the
Kirkwood court, 78 and it has not caught on more generally. 79
A third possibility, the “contrabroker method,” occurs when a
shareholder argues that she bought shares from a broker who, in turn,
purchased the shares from another broker who was a market maker for the
stock of the issuing firm. 80 The Kirkwood court quickly rejected this method,
however, because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the stock sold by
the market maker was from the tainted registration statement.81 In other
words, the market maker could have been dealing in older or newer issuances
of the firm’s stock. 82
Finally, Kirkwood considered a fourth alternative, which it called
“heritage tracing.” 83 Using this approach, a plaintiff traces back share
certificates in a manner akin to genealogy research. In the words of the court:
Plaintiffs contend that they purchased stock in the over-the-counter market and
received stock certificates registered in their individual names. In the records of
[the firm’s] stock transfer agent, plaintiffs identified by code number the
certificates they had received. Then plaintiffs identified the particular

75 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984). As an aside, the defending firm was represented by an attorney
named James O’Hagan at Dorsey & Whitney, who became infamous in corporate law circles a few years
later for his highly specialized knowledge of certain trading markets. See United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 647–49 (1997).
76 590 F. Supp. at 1378.
77 See id. at 1378–79.
78 Id. at 1380.
79 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 64, at 448–51 (describing one court’s analysis and ultimate rejection of
the fungible mass tracing method).
80 590 F. Supp. at 1381–82. Market maker, in this context, refers to brokers who stand ready to buy
or sell the stock of a particular firm to help establish trading liquidity.
81 Id. at 1381.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1382–83.
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certificates from which their individual certificates were issued. The process
was continued until plaintiffs determined the ultimate origin of their certificates.
Some of those certificates were expressly issued in the [allegedly fraudulent]
March 5, 1981 offering. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, they can trace their shares to
the offering. 84

This method sounds more promising, but identifying the lineage of old
stock certificates can be just as speculative as efforts to track down your
ancestors. For instance, under the facts of the case, the plaintiff received
three new share certificates: one that represented 1000 shares (MU038125),
one that represented 500 shares (MU038126), and one that represented 500
shares (MU038286). 85 But these new certificates did not correspond on a
one-for-one basis with other certificates that had been surrendered to the firm
upon sale. Rather, four different certificates (MU033047, MU037214,
MU037106, and MU037312) representing a total of about 9510 shares had
been fed into the meat grinder in order to crank out two of the plaintiff’s new
certificates, along with several others. 86 The first three surrendered
certificates could eventually be traced back to an offending registration
statement, using this same method of heritage tracing, but the last
surrendered certificate could not be linked back. 87 Moreover, since the
MU037312 certificate represented over 2020 shares, it was possible that all
of the plaintiff’s shares came from this “untainted” batch. 88 For this reason,
Kirkwood found the inquiry indeterminate and rejected proof via heritage
tracing in this context.89
Still another approach might be to permit all secondary market
purchasers who transact within a short time period after an offending
registration statement to join a Section 11 claim. A few courts have gone this
route, essentially abandoning the strict tracing requirement for a more

84

Id. at 1382.
Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1382–83. It is possible, of course, that heritage tracing might demonstrate a clear link. For
example, if the last certificate in Kirkwood had not been fed into the meat grinder to issue the new
certificates, then all the plaintiff’s shares could have been definitively linked to the tainted registration
statement. The real problem, however, is that the Kirkwood plaintiffs were only able to attempt heritage
tracing because the new certificates had been issued in their personal names. See Sale, supra note 64, at
452 n.153. As described earlier, this is not common for modern trading situations today; most shares are
held in street name, and heritage tracing thus offers little assistance for any buyer purchasing as a
beneficial holder.
85
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workable rule. 90 The problem, however, is that temporal claim allowance
represents a significant departure from the statutory language of the
Securities Act. 91 It also poses a risk of overdeterrence in an era where the
same share may be bought and sold by multiple parties repeatedly during the
short period when claims are allowed. Perhaps for these reasons, courts
rarely abandon the tracing test in favor of a temporal approach. 92
From the case law, it seems clear that impeccable share provenance is
still the standard for Section 11 litigation, and statistical tracing is not current
law. At the same time, definitively tracing shares back to a given issuance is
exceedingly difficult—usually impossible—in a world of fungible bulk
clearing. The upshot, then, is that most secondary market Section 11 claims
are denied, even when it is highly likely that a plaintiff bought some shares
from a “tainted” pool. This may or may not be problematic, depending upon
one’s views about the optimal level of deterrence under the Securities Act.93
Nonetheless, it does seem strange to establish a general principle that Section
11 claims are available for secondary buyers and then adopt a follow-on rule
that effectively guts those same claims in most contexts. 94
b. Appraisal rights
Another illustration of the identification problem involves shareholder
appraisal claims, an area of law that has recently seen a rise in legal activity. 95
90 See, e.g., Wade v. Indus. Funding Corp., No. C 92-0343 TEH, 1993 WL 650837, at *5–6 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (allowing purchasers who bought within the ninety-day period following a
registration statement to maintain their claims).
91 Nothing in the text of Section 11 suggests that standing should be governed by temporal
considerations. See supra note 64.
92 Cf. Sale, supra note 64, at 455 (describing how a handful of courts have used this method).
93 For a more general discussion of the merits and policy implications of Section 11 liability, see, for
example, Grundfest, supra note 55, at 56–58; Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Securities Act: The
Cornerstone Needs Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1 (2002); and Steinberg & Kirby, supra note 64.
94 To further complicate matters, Professor Joseph Grundfest has argued that the international scope
of initial stock offerings may throw an additional wrench into the machinery. See Grundfest, supra note
55, at 48–56. It can be argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), which restricted the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, has limited the availability of Section 11 claims to shares that are sold into domestic U.S. markets.
See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 48–49. In many situations, however, a firm may sell some of its initial
shares through foreign brokers who would not be considered domestic under a Morrison analysis.
Accordingly, it is possible that some shares sold in a public offering are rendered ineligible for a Section
11 claim. This fact alone might make it impossible to trace back downstream shares to ones that originally
qualified for legal standing. In a world of fungible bulk, a firm could conceivably evade all downstream
Section 11 liability simply by including one small international buyer to stymie the absolute tracing
requirements. See id. at 49. Of course, adopting a new clearing system that specifically traces shares
would resolve this conundrum.
95 See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1566–78 (2015) (tracking the incidence of appraisal claims
in recent years).
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Appraisal rights, in a nutshell, allow shareholders to sue for the fair value of
their shares, as determined through judicial proceedings, when they object to
a merger or related fundamental transaction. 96 In Delaware, an owner may
not seek appraisal rights if she votes her shares in favor of the merger. The
tool is only available for dissenters. 97
If you are a beneficial owner who holds shares continuously from the
time of a merger’s announcement through the shareholder vote and eventual
consummation of the deal, then it should be easy to dissent and perfect your
appraisal rights. When the voting instructions arrive from your broker, you
can vote your shares against the triggering transaction. Or you might just
abstain because nonvoting shares are also eligible for appraisal rights.98
Assuming that all goes according to plan, your lawsuit can proceed.
Given the complexity of this entire system, however, some missteps
will inevitably occur. Consider a recent appraisal case involving Dell Inc. 99
During 2013, a group of shareholders objected to the price paid in a goingprivate buyout of Dell by founder Michael Dell. 100 One of the larger
plaintiffs, T. Rowe Price, wished to instruct its bank custodian, State Street
Bank & Trust, to vote its shares against the buyout in order to perfect an
appraisal claim. 101 Amazingly, evidence emerged that these shares were
actually voted in favor of the deal by mistake. 102 Dell quickly seized upon
this fact to argue that T. Rowe Price’s stock had become ineligible for
appraisal rights because of this mistake. 103

96

See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law,
84 GEO. L.J. 1, 3–4 (1995) (describing appraisal rights and tracing their function); Barry M. Wertheimer,
The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618–26
(1998) (discussing the history and development of appraisal rights).
97 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2006).
98 Id. Said differently, only shares that vote in favor of the disputed transaction are disqualified.
99 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20 (Del. Ch. 2016).
100 Id. at 21–23.
101 Id. at 26–27.
102 Id. at 27–36. The fact that these sophisticated parties could make a voting mistake may sound
ridiculous, but it becomes more understandable when one considers that firms often outsource the actual
tasks of voting and vote processing to third parties. In this case, record holder State Street hired a firm
named Broadridge Financial Solutions (“Broadridge,” a large player in this area) to process client voting
instructions. Id. at 29. T. Rowe Price also outsourced the execution of its voting preferences to
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Id. at 25–26. During the Dell vote, T. Rowe Price intended to
vote against the merger and informed ISS of this decision. Id. at 26–27. ISS prepared to vote no. Id. at
27. But when the shareholder meeting was rescheduled, a new database record was prepared and the
voting instructions were reset. Id. at 27–28. T. Rowe Price had previously established a default voting
instruction of “yes” with ISS, and a failure to override this default a second time (due to the rescheduled
vote) led to the ultimate error. Id.
103 Id. at 36.
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The Delaware Vice Chancellor surely recognized T. Rowe Price’s
frustration, but he refused to allow the mutual fund to proceed with an
appraisal claim for these shares. 104 In many cases it may not be possible to
track down evidence related to how specific shares were voted, 105 but when
the evidence is available,106 the court held that it should be considered.107
Because the shares linked to T. Rowe Price’s position had clearly voted,
albeit mistakenly, in favor of the merger, T. Rowe Price, the beneficial
holder, lost its ability to pursue an appraisal claim. 108
The facts underlying this case are unusual, and we might expect that
future claimants will be more careful about how their shares are voted. Yet
the opinion also suggests that if specific shares can somehow be traced, then
the court should use this evidence to determine the availability of appraisal
rights. 109 Accordingly, though this case might otherwise be insignificant
because blatant voting mistakes are uncommon, it will take on much greater
significance if the technology used to clear and settle trades changes to allow
for traceable shares. 110

104

Id. at 55–56.
See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text.
106 The careful reader might wonder how Dell could prove that these shares had been voted in favor
of the transaction in a world of fungible bulk. The ability to link the voting instructions of T. Rowe Price
to a specific cluster of shares arose because Broadridge, the third party tasked with voting and vote
processing, had assigned a unique internal control number to each transaction. A required filing with the
SEC for mutual fund voting also provided additional evidence of the mistake. Dell Inc., 143 A.3d at 30–
36.
107 Id. at 52.
108 Id. at 59. Interestingly, this was not the only Dell appraisal case to limit a claimant’s appraisal
rights due to a technical violation of the qualification rules. In yet another proceeding related to this same
dispute, the court also held that some shareholders lost their appraisal rights when the formal record holder
for their shares changed from Cede to another custodial bank nominee. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.,
No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015). This event was triggered by a DTCC
policy of releasing shares to the custodian banks when they learned that the record holders wished to
dissent from a deal. Id. at *3. The banks, in turn, had a policy of formally retitling the shares in the names
of their own nominees under internal policies. Id. Taken together, the court ruled that the continuous
holding requirement of Section 262 had not been met and that plaintiffs lost their ability to seek appraisal
for these shares. As a matter of formal logic, this makes sense; as a practical matter, however, it is crazy.
The Vice Chancellor expressed consternation with this outcome—he spent half of his opinion advocating
for reforms that would lead to a different structural approach—but felt bound to follow historical
precedent that was established before the share immobilization reforms. Id. at *11–25 (arguing that
Delaware law should look through Cede and recognize the custodian banks and brokers as record holders
of the shares).
109 Dell Inc., 143 A.3d at 52 (“[Earlier decisions] address a situation in which there is an absence of
proof. In each of those cases, no evidence was available to show how Cede voted the particular shares for
which appraisal was sought . . . . It does not necessarily follow that just because in some cases there is no
evidence regarding how Cede voted, then in other cases where it does exist the parties cannot introduce
it and the court cannot consider it.”).
110 See infra Section III.B.2.a.
105
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A more common appraisal problem occurs when it is simply impossible
to trace an owner’s shares back to a specific vote. This can happen, for
instance, when an investor buys a block of stock after the record date for the
vote and seeks to exercise an appraisal claim. This strategy, sometimes called
“appraisal arbitrage,” became prominent in 2007, when an important
Delaware case took a permissive view on the availability of appraisal
rights. 111 In that case, a biotech company named Transkaryotic Therapies had
decided to sell itself to Shire Pharmaceuticals for $37 per share.112 A group
of twelve beneficial owners, holding nearly 11 million shares, disliked this
price and filed an appraisal claim. 113 The problem, however, was that they
had bought almost 8 million of their shares after voting rights for the merger
had been severed by the passage of the record date but before the deadline to
file for appraisal. 114 Did this after-bought stock qualify for appraisal?
As we might expect, the continuous record holder for these shares was
Cede. It was the formal legal owner of the Transkaryotic stock both before
and after the plaintiffs purchased their shares; only the identity of the
beneficial holders had changed. 115 Accordingly, the Delaware court
considered how Cede had ultimately “voted” its position: 12.9 million shares
voted yes and 16.9 million shares abstained or voted no. 116 It was impossible
to determine whether the plaintiffs’ 8 million shares belonged in the former
group or the latter because, unlike the Dell case, there was no forensic
evidence about how the plaintiffs’ shares were actually voted.
The court allowed the lawsuit to proceed, under the logic that enough
nonpositive Cede votes existed to support the plaintiffs’ exercise of appraisal
rights for the 8 million shares. 117 In other words, as long as there are enough
“qualified” votes to cover a petitioner’s claims, appraisal claims remain
viable. This decision seems to have sparked a surge of appraisal arbitrage
lawsuits, where latecomer purchasers routinely object to an announced
merger and insist that their shares are the ones that qualify for this legal
right. 118 As I have argued elsewhere, this is not necessarily a bad

111

See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
112 Id. at *1.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at *1–2.
116 Id. at *1.
117 Id. at *4. Query what would have happened if a claimant had sought to exercise the rights for 18
million shares or if two groups of claimants had sought to exercise the rights for 9 million shares each.
118 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 95, at 1578–79 (exploring but ultimately rejecting the
theory that Transkaryotic led to a large number of appraisal suits).
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development, 119 and Transkaryotic is clearly consistent with Delaware’s
historical treatment of record shareholders as the group that formally
matters. 120 Of course there might also be concerns about the expanded use of
latecomer appraisal claims, especially if the risk of a large lawsuit blocks
value-enhancing deals or leads to an increase in strike suits. 121
Debating the question of whether expanded appraisal rights is a good
or bad development, however, is not the point of this Article. As with the
Section 11-tracing jurisprudence, 122 the rise of appraisal arbitrage exposes a
clear mismatch between the use of fungible bulk for stock settlement
practices and the grant of legal rights to shareholders. In both cases, the
relevant corporate law was established and developed during an earlier era
when questions about ownership status were rarely so complex. Today, the
same precedents bind, but resolution of a legal claim often relies on a largely
indeterminate inquiry into the genealogy of shares. The gears do not mesh,
and this is not a sensible approach to corporate law.
2. Illegitimate Voting
Another cluster of concerns arises when an actor retains franchise rights
without economic exposure to the consequences of a decision. There are
numerous variants of this problem, which has been dubbed “empty voting”
in the literature. 123 For instance, an investor might buy a position in a
company that is the target of a merger bid, sell her shares after the record
date but before the date of the actual vote, and cast her votes against the
merger to block the deal. Though it may seem unlikely for her to bother to
119 See George S. Geis, supra note 50, at 1661–65 (exploring how appraisal claims might act as a
“back-end market for corporate control” in the face of an allegedly inadequate merger price). It is also
worth emphasizing, however, that this decision might create practical problems—especially if more
shares seek to assert a claim than are qualified under the Transkaryotic inquiry. A court would either need
to allocate qualified shares among the individual claimants or come up with some other method for
determining who gets to sue. This interesting problem may remain academic, however, even if traceable
shares do not change the law, because voter apathy may generate a sufficient number of abstentions to
support all appraisal claims.
120 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *9 (Del. Ch. July
13, 2015). Other cases have confirmed the lack of a legal tracing obligation for shareholder plaintiffs. See
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21,
2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan.
30, 2015).
121 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 325
(2017) (evaluating several possible concerns about appraisal arbitrage). But see Korsmo & Myers, supra
note 95, at 1588–97 (arguing that appraisal cases are less likely to lead to strike suits (meritless suits
brought for settlement value) because plaintiffs must bear the risk of a lower valuation and therefore have
an incentive not to bring spurious claims).
122 See supra Section I.C.1.a.
123 In the mid-2000s, Henry Hu and Bernard Black described these problems extensively. See Hu &
Black, Hedge Funds, supra note 10; Hu & Black, New Vote Buying, supra note 10.
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vote in this scenario, there can be ways for the investor to take economic
positions that will profit from this kind of spoilsport vote.
Consider a case involving the Canadian telecom firm Telus. 124 This
company had established two classes of stock, one with voting rights and one
without. The voting shares traded at about a 5% premium to the nonvoting
shares. 125 Telus eventually decided to eliminate this disparate treatment to
address investor concerns about a lack of franchise rights by consolidating
both classes of stock into a single class where everyone could vote. 126 But
Telus ignored the trading price differential, and its proposal sought to
combine both classes of stock on identical terms. In response to this news,
the price gap narrowed quickly, and the two classes of stock converged on a
similar price. 127
Mason Capital, a U.S.-based hedge fund, saw an opportunity. It bought
voting shares of Telus, while simultaneously shorting both the voting and
nonvoting shares. 128 This strategy allowed Mason to hedge away any
economic interest in the voting shares while retaining nearly twenty percent
of the vote. 129 Further, the net short position in the nonvoting shares allowed
Mason to profit if the proposal failed and the relative price gap of the
nonvoting shares dropped back to prior levels. In essence, Mason had
constructed a situation where it had strong ability and incentives to cast votes
in a way that would stymie the attempted transaction. 130
Lawmakers have not ignored empty voting problems, 131 but designing
a treatment for this malady is difficult. More disclosure is one option, though,
as suggested by the Telus story, the schemes used to perpetrate illegitimate
voting can grow complex. Hedging strategies are not always easy to identify,
and investors will sometimes arrive on an election day with far more votes

124 In re TELUS Corp., 2012 BCSC 1919 (Can. B.C.). This case is described in more detail in WolfGeorg Ringe, Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga, 28 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 154 (2013).
125 TELUS, 2012 BCSC 1919, para. 12.
126 Ringe, supra note 124.
127 Id.
128 TELUS, 2012 BCSC 1919, paras. 31–37. By taking short positions in these securities, Mason sold
shares that it did not at the time own.
129 Id.
130 Id. In the event, Telus became aware of the situation and elected to use an alternative Canadian
judicial procedure (a “plan of arrangement”) to accomplish the recapitalization. The plan had to be
certified by the court as fair and reasonable under the circumstances, and the court was willing to consider
Mason’s attempted sabotage in its deliberations. Id. paras. 54–69.
131 See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Delaware decisions have
exhibited consistent concern about transactions that create a misalignment between the voting interest
and the economic interest.”), rev’d sub nom. in part on other grounds, Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v.
Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010).
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than expected. 132 Some commentators have called for regulation that
removes votes from shareholders under certain situations, 133 but it is tricky
to delineate the range of conditions where such a remedy might be
appropriate. There is also a risk that interventions to disenfranchise some
shareholders will lead to new distortions. 134 For these reasons, difficulties in
the detection and prevention of empty voting persist.
Even apart from explicit malfeasance, vesting voting rights with a group
of people who have no reason to care about the outcome of a decision
because they have already sold their shares weakens corporate governance.
To make the political analogy, 135 it is as if a sizeable population departed a
democratic country, renounced their citizenship, but still cast ballots in a
subsequent election. A lack of economic investment in the outcome also
promotes apathy. Shareholder voting already suffers from concerns about
low turnout and a perception that many investors are rationally apathetic.136
Offering ballots to former owners cannot promote a healthier interest in the
process.
One response to these concerns might be to shorten the time between
the record date and the actual date of the vote. Under current Delaware law,
this period cannot be less than ten days, 137 but a gap of twenty days, for
instance, should lead to better voting incentives than a gap of fifty days. 138
Some firms are also starting to adopt bifurcated record dates, where one date
is used to convey notice of a shareholder’s meeting, while another later date

132 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Coupling and Equity Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 723–24 (2008) (showing the possibility that
economic ownership might also be hedged out while retaining appraisal rights).
133 See Ringe, supra note 124.
134 See, e.g., Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 789, 854 (2014).
135 In general, I would agree with Bayless Manning’s contention that there is little gain by comparing
democratic elections to corporation elections. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 226 (1962) (“[W]e have enough problems in the
corporate field without importing additional nettles from the democratic political process.”). But this
analogy seems apt.
136 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 526–28
(1990) (describing the general lack of shareholder incentives to vote); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In
Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L.
55, 59–66 (2016) (offering recent data on shareholder voting patterns at large firms).
137 See supra note 44.
138 To take a back-of-the-envelope example, if Apple has 5.25 billion shares outstanding, and an
average trading volume of 30 million shares per day, then shortening the gap by 30 days could
theoretically lead to a situation where the number of shareholder with ownership and voting rights
increases by 17% of the total shareholder base (30 million shares times 30 days / 5.25 billion total shares).
In actuality, of course, the increase is unlikely to be this large, as some of the buyers and sellers within
the 30-day period may be short-term traders who will churn the same shares during these 30 days.
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is used to convey the actual right to vote.139 The logical extension of this
strategy, of course, is to establish a system that sets the record date one hour,
or even one second, before the actual vote. Under current settlement
practices, however, this approach is just not practicable because it takes too
long to move back and forth through the various custodial layers.
A third type of problem is perhaps just as important as empty voting
and shareholder apathy: pure error. Professors Kahan and Rock have
described numerous “hanging chads” in the corporate election process. 140
These situations arise when shareholder votes are cast or processed
inaccurately due to the system’s complexity. Proxy materials may not arrive
in time for beneficial shareholders to vote. 141 Some last-minute votes (or
changes to votes) may not be counted in order to meet various deadlines.142
The total votes allocated to custodians by DTCC may not match the more
detailed aggregation of the custodian’s client accounts. 143 There are even
some reported cases of overvoting, where more votes are cast than there are
shares outstanding. 144 For all of these reasons, close shareholder votes should
not inspire confidence in accurate outcomes. 145
3.

Feedback Loops Between Poor Voting Infrastructure and
Corporate Governance Reform
A more general concern with untraceable shares is that poor voting
infrastructure might be creating feedback effects that thwart other sensible
corporate governance adjustments. Of course, we cannot really know what
corporate governance might look like with more accurate voting, but it is
certainly possible that our existing system has limited the attractiveness of
proxy access, shareholder bylaw proposals, or other governance initiatives.
After all, lawmakers and other parties might be more nervous about
establishing shareholder referendums on corporate decision-making if they
fret about the underlying accuracy of investor votes.
139 See, e.g., Daniel E. Wolf et al., Kirkland M&A Update: Setting the Record (Date) Straight,
KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Apr. 17, 2013), www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdate_041713.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KFA-QUCU].
140 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4.
141 Id. at 1249. These unvoted shares can make it more difficult to obtain a quorum and also prevent
approval of initiatives that require a majority of shares entitled to vote on a matter. Id.
142 Id. at 1251.
143 Id. at 1253.
144 Id. at 1258.
145 Further evidence of these concerns can be seen in vote recounts that result in altered outcomes.
For example, in 2017, Proctor & Gamble fought a highly publicized director election contest where an
activist investor initially lost the election but won the board seat during a recount. See Sharon Terlep &
David Benoit, P&G Concedes Proxy Fight, Adds Nelson Peltz to Its Board, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 15,
2017, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-concedes-proxy-fight-adds-nelson-peltz-to-its-board1513377485 [https://perma.cc/4YMZ-U959].
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The recent turmoil related to proxy access illustrates the impact that the
concern about inaccurate voting has on corporate governance. Questions,
such as whether shareholders should enjoy the right to include their preferred
board candidates on a firm’s ballot or whether they should be forced to
launch, and pay for, their own proxy battle to supplant an incumbent board,
have commanded significant attention over the past decade, with a turbulent
flurry of SEC reversals and judicial second-guessing. 146 Others have told the
story in detail, 147 and there is no need to recount the specifics here. At this
point, lawmakers seem to have abandoned efforts to mandate proxy access
while still allowing individual shareholder groups to seek these rights
through private ordering and shareholder proposals. 148
This may be the best outcome, as one might question the wisdom of a
one-size-fits-all approach. 149 But it is natural to wonder whether this same
equilibrium would have been reached if lawmakers had more confidence that
shareholder votes reflected unbiased incentives and could be processed
accurately.
Similarly, while we have seen a lot of recent activity in shareholder
proposals that influence firm decision-making, 150 some have questioned
whether this is a sensible way to govern. 151 Why should a handful of fringe
146 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435,
457–75 (2012) (describing federalism challenges related to proxy access and advocating for private
ordering solutions); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV.
1347, 1426–32 (2011) (asserting that many investors would not make use of proxy access and that the net
effect of these changes would be minimal).
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Catherine G. Dearlove & A. Jacob Werrett, Proxy Access by Private Ordering: A Review
of the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, 69 BUS. LAW. 155, 158-60 (2013) (examining specific actions by
firms shortly after it became clear in the case law that shareholder proposals to grant proxy access would
be permitted).
149 The debate chugs along with proponents of proxy access arguing that managerial accountability
and collective action problems require liberal proxy access. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst,
Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 349–50 (2010) (arguing against a noaccess default rule); Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence
from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 157 (2013) (presenting empirical
analysis that financial markets place a positive value on the increased availability of proxy access). Not
everyone agrees. Jill Fisch, for instance, has responded that universal access will lead to unjustified new
expenses, special interest board representation that will lead to intra-shareholder conflicts, and other
concerns. See Fisch, supra note 146; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 1352–53 (arguing that
proxy access may lead to increased costs, some internal conflicts, and some positive outcomes, but that
it is unlikely to matter due to large institutional ownership of shares).
150 See Ronald O. Mueller et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy
Season, GIBSON DUNN (June 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposaldevelopments-during-the-2017-proxy-season
[https://perma.cc/ZXA6-AHT6]
(reporting
943
shareholder proposals in 2015, 916 proposals in 2016, and 827 proposals in 2017).
151 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 601, 603 (2006).
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investors be able to hijack the agenda? 152 To be sure, there is a reasonable
counterargument: firms might embrace different models of shareholder
participation to produce diverse governance practices. 153 Indeed, we might
imagine a variety of reforms that could clarify and extend the ability of
shareholders to influence or constrain some corporate decisions.154 Before
fully embarking on such a project, however, it would be important to see
more integrity in the underlying infrastructure of shareholder voting.
It is also worth considering whether a healthier settlement system might
inspire more trust in board authority. Advocates of director primacy continue
to assert that greater shareholder activism brings strategic ignorance and
sows dysfunctional leadership teams. 155 But the argument that delegated
board authority should be trusted to represent the best interests of a firm’s
owners relies on the bedrock of legitimacy that reliable elections supposedly
confer. Much of the pushback against director primacy seems to arise from
concerns that incumbent board members will be able to leverage the firm’s
resources to maintain power even in the face of agency abuses. 156 It is at least
conceivable that a more accurate and responsive system to elect directors,
and to sue them if necessary, would dampen the cry for greater shareholder
power because it would become easier for shareholders to respond when
questionable managerial actions occur. 157
In sum, if we have a system that is more responsive to current
shareholders, and less prone to error, then lawmakers and corporate
managers might be willing to adopt other governance levers. It is impossible

152

Id. at 635.
See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate
Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 167, 172–73 (2011) (claiming that recent shareholder proposals are
receiving more support); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (advocating for more shareholder democracy).
154 See Smith et al., supra note 153, at 181–87 (proposing several, mostly technical, changes to
Delaware law that would clarify and extend shareholder participation in firm governance by making it
easier for shareholders to adopt new (and substantive) corporate bylaws).
155 See Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 603–15.
156 The agency cost problem has been discussed extensively in the legal and economic literature. The
foundation for much of this work can be found in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Additional discussions of agency abuses can be found in Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency,
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
57 (1989); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
and Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,
51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).
157 This all assumes, of course, that shareholders are somehow able to detect the agency abuses; this
information asymmetry lies at the heart of many problems. See supra note 156 (listing sources discussing
information asymmetry problems).
153
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to draw more solid conclusions, however, because this theory relies on
counterfactual assumptions about what might happen in the presence of
traceable shares.
*
*
*
To quickly recap, then, the financial services industry seems to have
cobbled together a functioning settlement and clearing system that is a stark
improvement over paper-based trading. But corporate law has paid a price
for the resulting complexity. The mechanisms for managing and tallying
shareholder votes encompass intricate layers of intermediaries that do not
inspire confidence in accurate outcomes. Some legal rights, such as Section
11 claims and appraisal lawsuits, are linked to impossible determinations
about when a specific share of stock was issued or how it was voted. And
timing delays can lead to a problematic decoupling of vested franchise rights
and economic ownership. These and other nasty entanglements caused by
complexity in the exchange infrastructure are unhealthy for corporate
governance. Is there a better way?
II. CREATING TRACEABLE SHARES
In 2017, DTCC announced a pilot project with IBM to clear securities
through a customized distributed ledger system, sometimes described as
blockchain technology. 158 This initiative will not impact stock markets, as it
focuses on the settlement of credit derivatives. 159 Nevertheless, the project is
important for several reasons. First, it signals that DTCC is beginning to
embrace distributed ledger technology to pursue cost savings and other
strategic benefits. 160 Second, the effort demonstrates that large technology
firms like IBM, with support from smaller “fintech” partners, are willing to
stand behind distributed ledgers and believe that they can be used to clear
financial trades on a meaningful scale. And third, the project enjoys the
backing of some of the world’s most important financial institutions,
including Barclays, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, UBS,
Wells Fargo, and others. 161

158 See Michael del Castillo, $11 Trillion Bet: DTCC to Process Derivatives with Blockchain Tech,
COINDESK (published Jan. 9, 2017, 12:59 PM; updated Dec. 21, 2017, 1:48 PM), http://www.coindesk.
com/11-trillion-bet-dtcc-clear-derivatives-blockchain-tech [https://perma.cc/EGV5-HGND]. This is a
major initiative but still one that would be dwarfed by any effort to transform stock settlement and clearing
systems.
159 Id.
160 The CEO of DTCC’s derivatives service subsidiary stated, “We believe our own internal savings
will cost-justify the project [with] additional saving to the industry.” Id.
161 These banks are all members of the “R3CEV consortium,” created in 2015 to help coordinate
banks interested in adopting distributed ledgers. Id.
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As efforts like this take root over the coming decade (the Australian
Stock Exchange has launched a similar undertaking 162), it is becoming
increasingly probable that the aging, back-office infrastructure of stock
settlement will be retrofitted with new technology. We have already
witnessed the revolution in front-end exchange—as open outcry trading pits
and loud people in bright jackets gave way to the hum of server farms and
click of electronic matching algorithms. Distributed ledger technology may
soon spark a similar disruption to the back end of securities exchange.
A. Distributed Ledger Mechanics
In many ways, distributed ledger clearing is the conceptual opposite of
current systems. 163 DTCC now uses a centralized, trust-based, and highly
guarded method that relies on economies of scale to conduct back-office
processing. 164 Distributed ledger technology would replace this with a
decentralized, trustless, widely replicated, and (possibly) transparent mode
of exchange. How does it work?
1. The General Idea
A distributed ledger is simply a sequential database of assets that is
shared across a network of users. 165 It is distributed in the sense that all
participants in the network have their own copy of the ledger identifying both
the historical transactions and the resulting ownership rights associated with
the entire group of assets. By comparison, most economic entities currently
use double-entry bookkeeping ledgers to track the disposition of their assets;
these ledgers are both private and fragmented. They only contain information
related to the specific assets that each firm owns. Distributed ledgers, on the
other hand, are more akin to government-managed real property registration
systems, where anyone might examine current and historical ownership
claims on a given parcel of property. But while public property records are
typically centralized and housed in a single location, with limited
accessibility, a distributed ledger can be split into hundreds or thousands of
162 See Jackie Range, New Australian Securities Exchange Chief Defends Blockchain Plans, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/45851b58-62d1-11e6-8310-ecf0bddad227 [https://
perma.cc/EKV6-DAT4].
163 See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS
TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE (2016) [hereinafter DTCC WHITE PAPER],
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/new-dtcc-white-paper-calls-for-leveraging-distributedledger-technology [https://perma.cc/3T7Z-VEJA] (discussing conceptual differences between current
clearing systems and the proposed distributed ledger technology).
164 Id. at 1.
165 Id.; see also David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and
Settlement 10–11 (Wash.: Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2016-095, 2016), https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.095 [https://perma.cc/5VBU-GVHT].
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identical copies and situated in the scattered computer systems of individual
members or users. 166
Version control obviously becomes critical. It would not do to have a
dishonest participant rapidly sell the same asset twice, before records can be
updated. Accordingly, changes must be incorporated quickly across all
versions of the ledger through a synchronization protocol. There are multiple
ways to manage this task. For instance, rights to edit the database might be
“unpermissioned” and open to public users under a consensus protocol where
anyone who plays by preordained rules can modify records, or the rights
might be secured in a way that controls or limits who can make changes and
how these changes must occur. 167 Moreover, the distributed ledger can be
public and fully transparent, or it can remain private and only accessible by
a limited number of members. 168 Indeed, to accurately describe a distributed
ledger system, we must distinguish between four alternatives: (1) traditional
ledgers where a single copy is privately retained by each user (“Type 1”)
(which is not a distributed ledger); (2) private distributed ledgers where there
are multiple copies of the ledger that may only be viewed and changed by
authorized participants (“Type 2”); (3) public distributed ledgers that are
viewable by many but modifiable only by a subset of trusted actors (“Type
3”); and (4) publicly shared distributed ledgers that may be viewed and
modified by any user under consensus protocols (“Type 4”). 169 The
cryptocurrency bitcoin, currently the most (in)famous application of
distributed ledger technology, is an example of the fourth variant. 170 By
contrast, the second and third variants seem to be the leading choices for new
financial market clearing platforms. 171
The accuracy and security of a distributed ledger is maintained through
blockchain technology, which ensures that all copies match and that all
modifications reflecting new transactions follow the same path. As users buy
and sell the relevant assets, blockchain technology gathers and organizes the
details of each transaction into a string of data according to an established
formatting algorithm. 172 Multiple transactions are then grouped and
transferred into a data block. 173 This block is linked, or “chained,” to the
166

Mills et al., supra note 165, at 10.
Id. at 12.
168 Id.
169 See DTCC WHITE PAPER, supra note 163.
170 See Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technologies in Securities PostTrading: Revolution or Evolution?, at 10, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series No. 172 (Apr.
2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DNJ-NQ7E].
171 Id. at 11.
172 See, e.g., id. at 12.
173 Id.
167
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earlier blocks of transactional data in the ledger, time-stamped, and
processed in a way that both refers to and verifies prior transactions. In other
words, the cryptography is designed so that it becomes progressively more
difficult for older blocks to be rewritten, increasing the verifiability and
security of prior transactions. 174 The results are broadcast to members in a
synchronization protocol, and the system starts a new cycle.
2. A (Slightly) More Technical Examination
The technical details of blockchain cryptography are mostly beyond the
scope of this Article, 175 but a slightly more extensive description might be
helpful for understanding the transformative nature of distributed ledgers.
First, consider a Type 4 (public distributed) ledger. A member joining the
distributed ledger network will receive unique public and private encryption
keys. The private key is used to certify a transaction and can be verified by
others in the network. 176 If a member wants to settle a fresh transaction, she
uses her private key to “sign” and transmit the relevant details (such as which
assets are being sold and to whom they are being transferred) through a string
of data. 177 The public key is analogous to an email identifier, and it allows
others—such as a buying party—to locate the selling member in order to
send funds related to the exchange. 178 Any such transfer to a member via their
public key can only be unlocked with that member’s private key. 179 As more
of these transactions occur, they are queued, processed, and eventually
published throughout the system according to the system architecture (more
on this in a moment). This makes the ledger verifiable to any participant with
read permission, in a way that should render the history of each transaction
secure and irreversible. 180
The right to publish changes to a distributed ledger may vary according
to the system. With an open, public network, such as bitcoin, any entity that
accomplishes a specific task might earn the right to add the next block of

174

Id.
For a more extended discussion, see Kariappa Bheemaiah, Why Business Schools Need to Teach
About the Blockchain (Mar. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University
Law Review).
176 Id. at 7–8.
177 Id.; see also Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain (MIT
Sloan Research Paper No. 5191-16, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2874598 [https://perma.cc/3SD8-XFRB].
178 See Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 8.
179 Id.
180 The security features of a distributed ledger make theft extremely difficult. See infra notes 190–
94 and accompanying text.
175
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data, subject to confirmation of its success. 181 The task will be arduous—
such as solving the next iteration of a complex mathematical puzzle—but
also easy to verify as correct once a solution is presented.182 With privately
permissioned networks, Types 2 and 3, the right to modify might not require
solving a task; preauthorized agents, such as banks, can simply add the new
block. 183
Independent participants may have incentives to record the details of
exchange transactions between other parties. For example, the solution to a
mathematical puzzle might incorporate the details from completed
transactions at the top of the recording queue. 184 Winning the race to solve
each iteration thus requires participants to process and memorialize the most
recent transactions. 185 The parties seeking to record their asset transfer details
might pay a commission to the recording member who successfully
publishes the transaction in the next block of data. 186 Or, members might earn
a “point” or “token” when they become the first person to solve the next
181

See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–13. This confirmation of success, or transaction
validation, will arise under a prearranged set of rules. For example, a member who successfully mines a
new solution to the current iteration of the challenge could be required to submit their answer to a
transaction validator who would quickly verify that the solution was correct and then spread the new
block to other transaction validator nodes. Once a majority of these validators agree that this is the first
viable solution (under the prearranged synchronization protocols), then the new block would be indelibly
written, and the process would begin anew. Id.
182 With bitcoin, for example, a member must find (or “mine”) a numerical solution that takes data
from the most recent solution and the valid transactions to be recorded as inputs. The goal is to combine
this data with another number, called a nonce, in a way that provides an output, when run through the
relevant hash function, that accomplishes some specific task—such as producing an output string that
begins with twelve zeros. The first person to accomplish this “wins” the right to write the data to the
distributed ledger, gains a bitcoin or token of value, and starts the cycle anew. All others must begin from
scratch with the new output string, and any leftover work from the prior iteration will probably be useless.
The task is thus (1) difficult to accomplish, as the solution nonce can only arise through trial and error
and massive computer processing power; and (2) easy to verify by looking at the solution output (for
example, are there really twelve zeros at the start of the output?). Moreover, the difficulty of the task can
be modified on the fly in an effort to render a solution slower or faster. Continuing with the bitcoin
example, if the goal of the system is to generate a new block approximately every ten minutes, then the
solution might require only ten zeros at the start of the string in order to expedite a solution, or require
fourteen zeros at the start of the string in order to delay the next solution nonce. See Bheemaiah, supra
note 175, at 10.
183 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–15.
184 Id. at 12.
185 Id.
186 Again, borrowing from the bitcoin example, a seller will typically pay a transaction fee to the
recording party denominated in some fraction of a bitcoin. For example, the current cost to record one
byte of data in the system might be 400 satoshis, where one satoshi (the smallest unit of bitcoin currency)
equals one hundred millionth (0.00000001) of a bitcoin. As one might imagine, the recording fees will
float according to the supply and demand of recording bandwidth. A system can also set fixed rates,
minimum and maximum rates, premium rates for priority recording, and use other features related to
queueing incentives. See Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 10.
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iteration of the problem, offer proof of this work, and publish another block
in the chain. 187 These tokens might then be monetized (as with bitcoin and
other cryptocurrency systems) and become valuable in their own right. 188
In closed distributed ledger systems, Types 2 and 3, it may not be
necessary to create cryptocurrency rewards via the generation of tokens. The
payment of commissions should be sufficient to incentivize members to
develop the next block in the chain. Indeed, if the members with modification
rights enjoy sufficient levels of trust, mining for the solution to a complex
mathematical puzzle may not be needed at all. The modifying parties will
simply add a new block whenever enough transactions are queued to justify
the next link in the chain. 189
Embedded throughout the use of distributed ledgers is a processing
“hash function,” the heart of the cryptography. A hash function is simply an
algorithm that takes a variable-length string of data as an input, crunches the
information, and spits out a fixed-length string of numbers and letters. 190 The
hash function used by bitcoin, for example, was initially devised by the
National Security Agency (NSA) and produces a 256-bit output. 191 An
identical output result is always obtained when the same string of input data
is fed into the function. 192 But it is exceedingly difficult to reverse engineer
the input data by observing only the output data; changing just one character
187 Id. In actuality, many transactions are bundled into every “solution” to increase capacity. The
ability to solve enough iterations of the problem to meet underlying transactional demand is a possible
limit to the underlying capacity of any blockchain clearing system. On days with a high volume of stock
trades, for instance, it is possible that a backlog of trades will gather to be bundled and processed by the
solving members. This could raise the same concerns as the paper system crisis of the 1960s, but there
would also be new worries relating to the timing and integrity of the synchronization protocol. See supra
notes 15–20 and accompanying text. Any backlog would also raise questions about the optimal way to
process queued transactions. Should everything be done on a first-in-first-out basis? Or should transacting
parties who wish to receive recording priority be able to pay a higher fee to a recording member in order
to jump the queue? These types of question can be sidestepped, of course, if capacity is not constrained.
188 Indeed, “initial coin offering” markets have started to emerge for various cryptocurrencies.
Investors buy the virtual currencies from successful miners in the hope that each coin or token will
appreciate in value. These markets are not the focus of this Article, though it is worth noting that they are
starting to present thorny regulatory questions. See, e.g., The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks
Becoming a Bubble, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21721425-it-may-also-spawn-valuable-innovations-market-initial-coin-offerings
[https://
perma.cc/Y6G9-S4G7].
189 Removing the need to solve a complex puzzle eliminates the creation of cryptocurrency coins
because it allows for the creation of new blocks on demand. This increases the speed at which a distributed
ledger can record transactions, which should also increase the security of a network as a rapidly evolving
chain becomes more difficult for a rogue member to rewrite. See Catalini & Gans, supra note 177, at 6–
11 (discussing verification costs).
190 Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 9.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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in the input string will completely transform the output of a hash function.193
In order to create the next block in the chain, a member will need to take the
output hash string from the most recent block and compute a new output hash
string that incorporates the details of the queued transactions for recording,
adds a time stamp for additional security, and meets any other predefined
requirements. 194
In this way, the most recently created block intersects with older blocks
in the chain. Because the only way to develop a new block is to begin with
the previous block’s output string—and because the only way to obtain the
previous block’s output string is to crunch the most recent transactional
records with the hash function—there will be an ongoing confirmation of
prior transactions that grows stronger as the length of the chain increases. 195
Any effort to rewrite history, by going back several links to change the
recorded owner of a given asset, will generate a different output string when
run through the hash function. This alteration would not match the results
obtained by other members and would be rejected. 196 The only way to
succeed in stealing assets through a modified distributed ledger would be to
find an alternative solution to the hash algorithm and quickly permeate this
alternative reality down through subsequent links in the chain in a way that
complies with the synchronization protocol. This is thought to be
exceedingly difficult, though not impossible, 197 because the correct chain
continues to move forward as other members add links—making any attempt
at theft a moving target.

193

Id.
See supra note 156. The predefined requirements may be arbitrary (such as producing an output
hash string that begins with a certain number of zeros), and typically serve to limit the supply of blocks
that can be generated.
195 Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 9–10.
196 In an open system like bitcoin, the resulting output hash function might also not meet the
requirements of the algorithmic puzzle. For instance, changing the owner of an asset recorded in the prior
link would lead to an output hash function that would not start with the required number of zeros. Id.
197
There are numerous online discussions about attacks and counterattacks of various
cryptocurrencies. One notorious battle occurred in 2016 when an anonymous party attacked a
cryptocurrency named ethereum seeking to steal assets from some other members. The event attracted
widespread media attention and was ultimately defended by a controversial “fork” response, under which
the system returned to a period before the attempted theft and created an alternative chain to stymie the
theft. For some, this cure was worse than the disease, as it demonstrated that blockchain history might be
rewritten under extreme circumstances, undermining some of the public trust that was thought to
accompany distributed ledgers. See Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That the DAO Was All
Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-justshowed-dao-human [https://perma.cc/X68D-Z3VA]; Jonathan Ore, How a $64M Hack Changed the Fate
of Ethereum, Bitcoin’s Closest Competitor, CBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016, 9:00 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/ethereum-hack-blockchain-fork-bitcoin-1.3719009
[https://perma.cc/9GC7-RM8M].
194
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Finally, each member will need to keep an accurate version of the
current ledger, or version control problems will proliferate. For this reason,
distributed ledgers must incorporate a synchronization protocol. The details
of alternative protocols can grow complicated, 198 but in a nutshell, a member
seeking to add a new block must generally broadcast its request and wait for
a majority (or supermajority) of participants to agree that the solution works
(if proof of work is required) and is timely (first in line to add a new block).199
Again, differences may arise between public and permissioned ledgers, 200 but
once the pending block is verified, the new chain of data should be
irrevocably connected. The data is disseminated throughout the network, and
the next cycle begins.
Many questions remain, of course, about the efficacy, governance, and
security of distributed ledgers. Will there be enough capacity to process all
of the pending transactions, or might everything bog down when volume
spikes? Is there a natural limit or end point to the use of a specific hash
function, such that a mature distributed ledger might need to be transplanted
to a new system after some period of time? To some extent, these concerns
might be addressed or mitigated by establishing variable proof of work
standards 201 or by using metasynchronization protocols that allow temporary
differences to arise. Multiple chains could possibly be reconciled later by
braiding individual strands into a master chain. 202 But these strategies, in
turn, would raise governance concerns, such as who should be entitled to

198 For example, some networks may limit the pace at which any single member can broadcast new
blocks through an iterative process that requires everyone else to also propose a new block. This mitigates
the ability of a single rogue participant to spam inaccurate information, but it may also limit the pace at
which changes can be made. There are other design possibilities, but the output must always be consensus.
See Mills et al., supra note 165, at 13–14.
199 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–15.
200 With public ledgers, for instance, the validation process may require individual members to verify
that the solution is correct. With a private ledger that does not contain a proof-of-work requirement, the
key question may be only who is first in line to add the next block. Id. at 12–14.
201 The use of a variable number of zeros at the beginning of the bitcoin hash function is a good
example of this. See supra note 156. Making a puzzle easier or harder to solve is a good way to increase
or decrease the system capacity. In some cases, it may be possible to write rules in advance that establish
when and how this variability will be implemented. For example, if the goal is to add a new block
approximately every ten minutes, then a failure to meet this deadline with the most recent block or with
several blocks in a row could trigger an easier version of the puzzle. Conversely, excessively rapid block
creation would lead to more difficult problem architecture.
202 This topic raises another important question—Can disparate, distributed ledger systems be
stitched together in a way that avoids fragmentation? This is conceivably quite important for the use of
distributed ledgers to settle and clear stock trades, because brokers or intermediaries may not all wish to
adopt a single system at the outset of this project. If several systems are put in place at the same time, it
may become necessary to combine the data in some manner in order to obtain comprehensive information
about firm ownership.
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exercise any discretion that is built into the adaptive rules, 203 and whether the
power to make these changes would create new risks of fraud or abuse.
Perhaps the most worrisome concern is security. Distributed ledgers are
designed to be tamper-resistant, but it is always possible that a rogue member
might hack a system to steal assets from other parties by retroactively
rewriting the history of asset transfers. Because the ledgers are supposed to
provide an indisputable record related to the truth of ownership, it may not
be easy to make a convincing case that something improper occurred.
Relatedly, an important distributed ledger may create a tempting target for
terrorism and invite attacks that seek only to harm instead of steal. Generally,
these types of attacks are thought to be difficult to accomplish because of the
historical record that permeates the database and the consensus-oriented
synchronization protocols. 204 But the risk is still there.
Despite all this, commentators have grown increasingly excited about
the ways that distributed ledgers might be used for innovation. 205 Some
predict that this technology will ultimately have as much impact on the
economy as the invention of double-entry bookkeeping or the Internet. 206 The
applications are seemingly endless and often speculative. For example, some
have suggested that distributed ledgers will unleash a new breed of “smart
contracting,” where electronic agents can automatically execute and update
agreements as various conditions unfold over time. 207 It is not entirely clear
what smart contracts mean or how code might replace law and human
agency. Some uses of this technology are more straightforward, however,
and it is not too hard to imagine how distributed ledgers could transform
stock settlement and clearing processes. 208
B. New Stock Clearing Methods
If we could snap our fingers and create an ideal stock clearing platform,
we would probably abandon paper share certificates, along with the
203

See, e.g., Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 27.
See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016).
206 See, e.g., Blockchain: The Next Big Thing, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/special-report/2015/05/09/the-next-big-thing [https://perma.cc/S9N4-SW9G].
207 See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305 (2017)
(offering a more general discussion of smart contracts and their legal implications); Trevor I. Kiviat, Note,
Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 605–07 (2015)
(discussing a smart contract to trade futures).
208 Typically, the first large-scale application of distributed ledger technology relates to improved,
real-time payment systems. But better settlement and clearing architecture for securities is often not very
far behind payment systems on the list of likely applications. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note
205, at 18–19.
204
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complicated and multi-layered distinction between record and beneficial
owners. A share of stock would trade electronically, perhaps through brokers
and exchanges, but the details of each transfer would be processed by a
secured and trusted protocol that specifically identifies each share being
exchanged. This information would be rapidly updated (ideally in real time)
and accessible by appropriate parties with the right clearance or,
conceivably, by the public. In short, we would have immediate clearing of
stock transfers in a way that preserves a precise chain of title.
Five or ten years ago, most experts would have dismissed this vision as
fantasy. It was simply too difficult to imagine how state-of-the-art computing
power could keep up with the ongoing tide of trades. Recently, however, it
has become possible to envision how distributed ledger technology might be
adopted to permit direct and rapid settlement of stock trades.
Early platforms are emerging. 209 The goal is to create a “golden ledger”
of stockholders, reflecting the most current ownership data and substantially
reducing, or perhaps even eliminating, the need for the custodial
arrangements described in Part I of this Article. Piloting fintech firms
anticipate processing thousands of transactions per second while maintaining
a complete and perpetual record of all historical transactions related to any
security. 210
One of the more interesting questions involves the role, if any, that
banks, brokers, and other intermediaries might play in a new settlement
platform. 211 It is possible to imagine a world of complete disintermediation,
where individual investors join exchanges directly, downloading software to
participate as full members of a distributed ledger. They could buy or sell
stock directly through the exchange and write changes to the distributed
ledger under a public protocol akin to that used by bitcoin. 212
On the other hand, there are many reasons to believe that complete
disintermediation will not occur. For one, some investors will continue to
enjoy the financial advice that they receive from experts, and they might be
209 For example, one venture named SETL is building a custom blockchain application that allows
brokers to settle transactions on a peer-to-peer distributed ledger. See Jemima Kelly, Computershare
Teams Up with Start-up SETL on Blockchain Project, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:51 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-securities-blockchain-computershare/computershare-teams-up-withstart-up-setl-on-blockchain-project-idUSKCN0XP1NL [https://perma.cc/YYF4-3NZM].
210 See id.
211 See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 165, at 6–8 (exploring the costs and benefits of intermediaries in
distributed ledgers); DTCC WHITE PAPER, supra note 163 (same).
212 It is also possible, of course, to imagine a specialization of labor similar to the evolution of the
bitcoin system. Investors uninterested in mining for new blocks might have their transactions queued for
processing by other miners in the exchange. These miners may not trade actively in equity securities, but
rather seek to generate revenues through commissions, the generation of cryptocurrency coins, or both.
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loath to trade directly. Others may continue to seek the diversification and
scale benefits that arise through mutual funds and alternative investments,
such as hedge funds. Moreover, the security risks and capacity limitations
associated with a public ledger stock exchange will probably be too great for
most people to stomach in the near term. Recall that public blockchains
require members to submit some proof of work in order to earn the right to
add a new block to the distributed ledger. 213 This has clear advantages in a
world of distrust: one must incorporate the queued transactions for recording
in the solution algorithm. However, it significantly limits the speed with
which trades can be memorialized because all parties must wait for a new
solution to be discovered through brute computing trial and error. 214
For these and other reasons, it is likely that banks and brokers will
continue to play a role in the creation and operation of new stock clearing
platforms. One can imagine, for instance, a project where a consortium of
intermediaries establishes a private ledger where they are the only ones with
viewing and modification rights. An investor seeking to buy or sell stock
would contact a broker member to execute trades. The broker would locate
a counterparty and then process and record each transaction on the
distributed ledger. 215 With just a small number of permissioned parties who
trust each other, each broker would not need to solve an algorithmic puzzle;
they could just write a new block as soon as a sufficient number of
transactions are queued for processing. 216
From the client’s perspective, not much would seem to change. The
brokers would continue to provide economic information and share
positions. The trades would settle more quickly, and there would be a
detailed and traceable record of title for every single share of stock.
Depending on the level of visibility offered by the ledger, clients might be
able to see ownership and trading data about other shareholders in a firm. It
is also possible, however, that the platform might keep this information from
individual investors. 217
213

See supra notes 155–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156.
215 Various financial arrangements are possible to ensure that client funds are available to stand
behind these trades in a manner consistent with current arrangements between broker and client (such as
those relating to margin trading).
216 The threat of sanction or expulsion from the network for misdeeds might also mitigate bad
behavior by brokers.
217 Determining how much access should be provided to historical trading data will raise interesting
regulatory issues. For example, some investors or brokers may seek to monitor the identity of specific
traders closely to determine whether senior executives at a firm or renowned external traders are changing
their positions in order to glean information about the firm’s current prospects. In other words, there may
be governance benefits to obtaining data about insider trades on a real-time basis. See, e.g., David
Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 17–26 (2017).
214
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Moving to a different clearing system would introduce some new costs.
One advantage of fungible bulk is that intraday trades can be netted against
each other in a way that reduces the ultimate need to record bookkeeping
adjustments for every stock trade.218 Imagine, for instance, an active daytrader who consistently buys a share of Amazon whenever the price hits $990
and sells it at $1000. In a single volatile day, this hypothetical trader may
move in and out of this stock several times or more. Under current systems,
brokers need not worry about clearing each of these intraday transactions.
Rather, the trader’s moves can just be netted against all of his other trades
and tallied at the end of the day, or some equivalent processing milestone.
For example, ten buys and nine sells would ultimately result in a need to
settle and clear just one share of Amazon stock for this trader. In this same
way, banks and brokers may first determine the total change in share position
by all of their internal clients and only report this net change in position to
DTCC at the end of the day. For large custodians, many of the accounting
adjustments for internal clients might be accomplished within the walls of
the bank or brokerage by moving money and share positions between
clients.219 Only the residual amounts need be settled at the end of the day
with DTCC.
By contrast, under a distributed ledger system, every single move by
our hypothetical day trader would need to be incorporated into the chain of
title. This is not insurmountable, but it would mean that actively traded firms
might have much longer histories of ownership and require more significant
processing activity to track share provenance.
Moreover, a number of important questions will need to be answered
before distributed ledger platforms change stock clearing practices. 220 Who
would pay for an infrastructure rewiring project and why? 221 Should a system
be managed and/or viewable on a private distributed ledger or available for
public access? What privacy protocols should be established for individual
investors? Could a new system scale to handle the necessary volume of stock
218 See, e.g., Michael McClain, How Does DTCC Netting & Settlement Reduce Risk and Cost for the
Industry?, DTCC (Nov. 28. 2017), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2017/november/28/how-does-dtccnetting-and-settlement-reduce-risk-and-cost-for-the-industry [https://perma.cc/ZUY5-LM8K].
219 By some estimates, the use of netting allows banks and brokers to reduce clearing activity by
ninety percent or more. Id.
220 See, e.g., Geis, supra note 50, at 1669–70.
221 Many people would benefit from stock-clearing reforms: investors (through better
governance and perhaps higher firm values), aspiring managers (through an ability to mount proxy
contests), adjudicators (through clearer governance mechanisms), and perhaps those responsible
for operating the new system (if they can command a reasonable profit for their services). But
there is an obvious free-rider problem because once the clearinghouse is established, everyone
can take the benefits without necessarily contributing funds for the completion of the efforts.
Id. at 1669.
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trades? 222 Can pilot efforts or dual-system clearing processes be implemented
to test new clearing platforms without leaping over a cliff? 223 Who, if anyone,
would ultimately retain governance rights over the clearing infrastructure,
and would these governance rights introduce new security or regulatory
concerns? Until these and other questions are answered, it is not obvious that
clearing institutions, corporations, financial institutions, investors, and
regulators will be willing to abandon a slow and clumsy system that works
for a rapid and elegant system that relies on exciting but unproven
technology. A major stock settlement failure would be catastrophic.
In any event, the point of this Article is not to evangelize for change.
The move to a new technology paradigm is not inevitable, but the promise
of cheaper, 224 faster, and (possibly) more secure clearing systems does mean
that the odds of a transformation cannot be ignored. Any change is unlikely
to happen overnight, but neither is this purely the stuff of science fiction.
DTCC is testing the waters. Some companies have issued shares that trade
electronically on a distributed ledger backbone. 225 The former Governor of
Delaware has launched an initiative to clarify how the state’s corporate law
will work for distributed ledger stock transfers.226 The Australian Stock
Exchange is transitioning everything to a distributed ledger clearing
platform. 227 And entrepreneurial tech firms, armed with funding from
financial institutions, continue to grapple with the best ways to design new
systems. 228 It is not too early to consider the legal effects of an exchange
technology that eliminates the need for centralized stock holdings in
unidentified fungible bulk.
222 Daily trading volume vary significantly, but, by way of illustration, roughly one billion shares
were traded on the NYSE each day during the first month of 2017. See NYSE Group Volume in All Stocks
Traded, supra note 35.
223 The notion here is that trades would continue as normal, but over time an electronic signature
would be added to more and more trades. Eventually, the system could be “switched on,” run in parallel
for some time to permit testing, and eventually “take over” as the exclusive trading method.
224 One recent report estimates that banks might save $15–$20 billion per year by migrating clearing
and other processes onto distributed ledger technologies. See SATANDER ET AL., THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER:
REBOOTING
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
14–15
(2015),
https://www.finextra.com/finextradownloads/newsdocs/the%20fintech%202%200%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5644-83RQ].
225 See Cade Metz, Overstock Begins Trading Its Shares via the Bitcoin Blockchain, WIRED (Dec.
15, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/overstock-com-issues-stock-via-bitcoinblockchain [https://perma.cc/6CRH-LSBU].
226 See Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the
Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/
delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance
[https://perma.cc/98AV-WHHT].
227 See Range, supra note 162.
228 See del Castillo, supra note 158.
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III. THE IMPACT ON CORPORATE LAW
The defining feature of traceable shares is that every unit of stock will
have a clear chain of title identifying all current and prior owners. Stock will
no longer need to be physically isolated and held in unidentified fungible
bulk. In many cases, investors may not notice a difference: buyers can
happily accept the economic rights that accompany each share without
giving a second thought to the lineage of ownership history that accompanies
this transfer of title.
The elimination of fungible bulk holdings by intermediaries and the
increased transparency of share provenance, however, would address some
of the governance concerns described earlier in this Article. Voting rights
would be exercised by current owners, rather than stockholders who sold
their shares after the record date. 229 Section 11 claimants could easily trace
shares to establish standing. 230 Appraisal litigants would no longer need to
face indeterminate inquiries about how their shares have voted. 231 The
increased trust in accurate outcomes might bolster the use of other corporate
governance mechanisms, such as shareholder proposals. 232 On a more
general note, the ability to track the granular histories of current and former
shareholders might present opportunities to rethink foundational theories of
corporate and shareholder responsibility. This Part considers each of these
ideas in turn, offering some thoughts on how corporate law might benefit
from traceable shares.
A. Voting
Firms with traceable shares should find it possible to significantly
narrow the temporal decoupling of governance rights and economic interest.
Voting power can remain attached to stock for a longer period of time,
preventing sellers from voting shares they no longer own weeks or months
after a trade. Indeed, investors might be able to continue buying and selling
stock with voting power right up until the moment a vote is called.
To be sure, advance notification of an election would still be required,
so that shareholders (or potential shareholders) would have time to muster
information, evaluate competing proposals, and make up their minds. But
firms would no longer need to set a record date that severs voting rights far
in advance of election day. There would be little need to move up and down
through layers of custodial ownership to identify current holders, send them
229
230
231
232

See supra Section II.C.2.
See supra Section I.C.1.a.
See supra Section I.C.1.b.
See supra Section I.C.3.
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the relevant information, and process voting instructions on their behalf. For
example, a firm might announce on May 1 that all current shareholders on,
say, 4:00 p.m. EDT on June 15 will have voting rights that will be tallied
over the next twenty-four hours. 233 These votes, many of which could be cast
earlier than June 15 if desired, would be gathered, checked against the
“golden ledger” of owners to ensure that each voting shareholder really did
hold the shares on June 15 at 4:00 pm, and counted accordingly. 234
A centralized ledger of owners would also reduce the need to enlist
brokers or proxy solicitation firms to track down beneficial owners and
distribute voting materials. Shareholders would still need to receive the
relevant information, including voting instructions, but this might now be
accomplished with three overlapping strategies. First, upon announcement
of an upcoming vote, all current shareholders could be sent this
information—possibly drawing upon a contact database that is linked to their
identification as owner in the distributed ledger. Second, as shares trade
between this announcement date and the day that is designated for the vote,
new purchasers could be sent this same information. Third, all of the voting
materials might be uploaded to a central online repository, 235 accessible by
anyone who wants to watch from the sidelines while contemplating a
possible acquisition of shares. Every vote will be verified by checking the
stock ownership records against the timestamped distributed ledger database,
so there should be no need to worry about former owners or unrelated parties
casting fraudulent votes. These would be rejected as invalid. For this reason,
it is even possible that ballots might be made available to anyone.
Processing votes in this manner would result in a variety of benefits.
The most obvious one is a reduction of unintentional errors, allowing firms
to gain confidence in the accuracy of shareholder votes and minimizing the
messy litigation that can occur when record holders make a mistake or fail
to vote shares as instructed. 236 Overvoting would also be screened out,
recounts would be reduced, and there would no longer be a need to reconcile
subtotals among various custodians or to worry about situations where the
233 Paper proxies might still be used for owners without online access or for long-term investors who
will not change their positions and want to vote before the twenty-four-hour window—though some
additional processing would obviously be required.
234 The identity of the person actually performing these validation and processing tasks presents other
interesting questions, but it is likely that current tallying agents, like Broadridge, would migrate their
business models to perform such services. It is also possible that the new platforms would offer these
services directly.
235 This central online repository could perhaps be maintained by a leading proxy solicitation firm
or vote-processing outsourcing vendor.
236 See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 153–54 (Del. Ch. 2010) (documenting voting mistakes
by the record owner in a closely contested director election), rev’d sub nom. in part on other grounds,
Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010).
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aggregate share count of custodial banks and brokers does not match the total
number of shares issued by the firm. 237
This new system might also help deter some of the undesirable
consequences of empty voting, where franchise rights are exercised without
economic interest. 238 By linking votes to share ownership for a longer period
of time, there would be fewer situations where loose votes are available for
sale or manipulation. 239 To be sure, rewiring the exchange infrastructure
would only address a small part of this problem. It still might be possible for
an aspiring empty voter to buy and hold the actual shares, thereby retaining
the vote, while hedging away the economic risks of ownership through swaps
or other derivative transactions. 240 It would take other, more comprehensive
solutions to close down empty voting entirely.
Similarly, even a perfect golden ledger of owners is unlikely to be a
panacea for shareholder voting concerns. Information might be sent to
outdated addresses. Changes to votes might remain difficult to count,
especially if votes continue to be cast though the mail. 241 Many shareholders
might remain rationally apathetic, ignoring their perfectly traceable voting
rights just as regularly as they ignore the current missives to submit voting
instructions from custodial brokers. 242 More generally, large mutual funds
and other institutional holders could continue to cast votes according to a
prearranged formula—perhaps hewing to the advice received from thirdparty proxy advisory firms. If so, this could drown out much of the impact
237

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See Jordan M. Barry et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting
and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1120–24 (2013); Hu & Black, New Vote Buying, supra
note 10, at 828–36 (describing the concerns with empty voting); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman,
Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 160–62, 174–75 (2009) (arguing for a ban on share voting by
parties with no economic interest).
239 Relatedly, the wisdom of allowing shareholder votes to be sold in public or private markets has
been debated for some time. For more on this topic, see Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of
Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427–28 (1964) (advocating
unrestricted vote selling), and Thompson & Edelman, supra note 238, at 162–66 (doubting the wisdom
of vote sales).
240 This was the strategy employed in the now-famous Mylan–King merger, where a large
shareholder in the target firm purchased shares in the acquiring firm so he could vote for the transaction
on both sides to increase the odds of approval and thereby realize a large premium on his target shares.
See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 238, at 153–54. In implementing this strategy, the shareholder
hedged away his economic interest in the acquiring firm—calling into question whether his ability to vote
was really in the best interest of the acquiring firm’s owners. Id.
241 If shareholders are still able to switch positions by revoting their shares, then processing firms
will need to establish which vote came last. Arguably, allowing shareholders to change their minds by
revoting shares might be less important with traceable shares because it is easier to wait until the date of
the vote, but it may still be beneficial to offer this flexibility in the event that, say, a new suitor emerges
in a corporate takeover situation.
242 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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of voting with traceable shares in an era when more and more shareholding
occurs through intermediaries. 243
Nevertheless, tighter voting links should chip away at the problem of
voter apathy. As weak as the incentives are for some shareholders to vote,
they are generally far worse for former shareholders. Eliminating the record
date gap might also spark buying sprees where hedge funds or other activist
purchasers seek to obtain meaningful positions in a firm in order to exercise
franchise rights and influence an election as the voting date nears.
B. Shareholder Lawsuits
Traceable shares will also offer clarity in situations where legal rights
are linked to an earlier disposition of specific shares and shareholders must
prove this link to exercise their rights. Again, Section 11 litigation and
appraisal valuation claims provide useful examples that illustrate the effect
that adopting distributed ledger technology would have on shareholder
lawsuits.
1. Section 11 Litigation
Recall the primary problem with Section 11 litigation: plaintiffs who
purchase shares on the secondary market are allowed to sue for fraudulent
registration statements, but only if they can prove (with absolute certainty)
that they bought shares issued during the tainted filing. 244 In a trading system
that relies on fungible bulk, it is usually impossible to trace downstream
shares back up to the problematic registration statement. 245
With traceable shares, however, the inquiry should become routine. A
plaintiff would run a query on each of her shares to examine the chain of title
and determine which ones qualify for a Section 11 claim. Notions of
statistical tracing, heritage tracing, or obscure legal methods for tracing

243 Concerns related to the voting of mutual funds and other aggregate and large yet passive
institutional owners present a host of important and difficult governance questions. See, e.g., Kahan &
Rock, supra note 146, at 1426–30. Other commentators have chronicled how increased voting obligations
for these firms have led to increased reliance on proxy advisory firms—who are happy to advise
(sometimes reluctant) mutual fund managers on how to cast votes. See, e.g., George W. Dent., Jr., A
Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287. This can have a large influence as more and
more investors purchase market index funds through large intermediaries. One interesting question,
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether it might be possible and worthwhile for individual mutual
funds to use distributed ledger technology to “pass through” proportional voting rights to their ultimate
investors. For instance, an investor who owns 1000 shares of Vanguard’s Total Market Index Fund might
see this position translate into voting rights for two shares of Apple stock. It is not clear that pass-through
voting is practical or desirable, for a variety of reasons (including an increase in shareholder apathy upon
receiving hundreds of fractional voting rights), but the topic is worth considering.
244 See supra notes 46–57 and accompanying text.
245 See supra Section I.C.2.a.
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shares would become obsolete because no inferences are needed. 246 Indeed,
a plaintiff could conceivably bring a class action on behalf of all shareholders
who currently own the stock issued by the offending registration statement.247
The practical effect of this development, then, would be to resurrect Section
11 liability for secondary market purchasers. This may be a desirable policy
because it would offer proportional deterrence for fraud. 248 That is, firms
would not be able to evade liability by invoking impossible tracing
obligations, but they would also not face excessive liability from all
downstream secondary market purchasers. Only the exact number of shares
issued via the fraudulent registration statement would be eligible to recover.
2. Appraisal Claims
Turning to the appraisal context, recall that these claims are not allowed
for shares that vote in favor of a triggering transaction, even though it is often
impossible to determine how any given share has been voted. 249 Courts must
therefore rely on aggregate vote counts by the record holder (typically Cede)
to set an upper limit on the number of shares that will qualify for appraisal. 250
Apportioning eligible shares among multiple claimants is indeterminate.
By contrast, traceable shares would offer a clean solution to the
appraisal identity problem. The first benefit would arise through the
narrowing of the voting gap, as described above. Because purchasing
shareholders could obtain the vote much closer to the actual date of a
decision, there would be less need to argue about how late-purchased shares
had been voted by others. Instead, dissenters could buy shares, retain the
vote, and offer evidence that their shares qualified for appraisal because they
had voted no. Moreover, a reduction in custodial processing should eliminate
both agency errors, as seen in the Dell case, 251 and disputes about whether a
plaintiff’s specific shares qualified for appraisal rights where Cede formally
casts a large cluster of fungible share votes. In other words, there would be
no need to debate whether a custodial record holder had cast enough
nonpositive votes to support all claims or to worry about how to allocate a
limited pool of qualified shares among multiple appraisal claimants.
Plaintiffs acquiring shares after a merger announcement, but before the vote,
could vote directly on the deal.
246

See, e.g., Sean Belcher, Note, Tracing the Invisible: Section 11’s Tracing Requirement and
Blockchain, 16 COL. TECH. L.J. 145 (2017).
247 For additional discussion of the history and evolution of Section 11 litigation claims, see
Steinberg & Kirby, supra note 64, at 1–31.
248 Cf. Grundfest, supra note 55, at 56–58 (discussing the optimal scoping of Section 11 liability).
249 See supra Section I.C.2.b.
250 See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
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Some tricky situations could persist. Imagine, for instance, that a
shareholder votes yes on a merger but then sells the share before the deadline
to process votes. The new purchaser should retain rights to revote this share
against the deal and, thereby, resurrect an appraisal claim. In order to retain
these rights, however, the verification protocols for determining how this
specific share voted would need to screen out the earlier selling shareholder’s
vote. This would require the creation of additional screening protocols to
match up the full slate of votes against the final golden ledger of
shareholders.
Interesting trading events might also arise if a gap remains between the
period when votes are due and the deadline for filing an appraisal claim. I
have suggested above that this gap may be short, but it is still possible that
bifurcated markets would emerge where some buyers seek to find traceable
shares that did not vote in favor of a transaction to amplify their pending
appraisal claims. This development could present new marketing and pricing
questions (would shares linked to different voting positions trade for
different amounts?), while also creating new opportunities for brokers
looking to obtain specific types of shares for their clients. Other interesting
situations might occur with the fragmentation of share markets. To the extent
that the record date gap can be minimized or eliminated with better clearing
technology, however, these puzzles will disappear.
C. Shareholder Proposals, Proxy Fights, and Information Transparency
Traceable shares and the creation of a centralized, real-time shareholder
database would also likely impact some other levers of corporate
governance, including shareholder proposals and proxy contests. Currently,
it can be difficult to lead successful shareholder initiatives that either moot a
contentious issue or advocate a rival slate of directors. Some of this expense
stems from the need to comply with detailed requirements governing proxy
communications with shareholders. 252 But another category of expense arises
through the practical need to conduct a political campaign by hiring advisors
(typically lawyers and proxy solicitation firms) to track beneficial owners
though labyrinths of intermediary owners and lobby for marginal votes. 253 A
252 The primary regulatory framework arises under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, which prohibits parties from soliciting proxies (defined broadly) in violation of SEC rules. These
rules go on to require anyone soliciting a proxy to prepare and distribute a proxy statement to
shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3 to -5 (2018) (codifying Rules 14a-3, 14a-4, and 14a-5).
253 One recent contest, for example, cost an estimated $60 million or more. See Julie Creswell, An
Epic, and Costly, Boardroom Battle at Procter & Gamble, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/economy/an-epic-and-costly-boardroom-battle-atprocter-gamble.html [https://perma.cc/7LNF-GVTP] (“[T]he two sides will have spent at least $60
million, and probably tens of millions more, as they try to sway investors to their point of view.”).
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centralized database of owners might help to cut these transaction costs and
increase the practical use of shareholder initiatives for a wider range of
qualified governance concerns. 254
A renewed interest in shareholder governance initiatives, including the
important battlegrounds of bylaw modifications and proxy fights, seems
likely. As mentioned earlier in this Article, it is possible that uncertainty
about the integrity of voting has prevented legal reforms aimed at creating
broader shareholder governance. 255 Lawmakers might be willing to rethink
elective or mandatory investor governance initiatives in the wake of cleaner
voting infrastructure.
While it is difficult to know whether the use of alternative governance
strategies would really increase with traceable shares, decisions about what
information regarding current shareholders is provided to the public will
impact any evolution in this direction. On one extreme, we can imagine that
distributed ledgers might make shareholder information fully transparent.
They could offer real-time data about the identification and ownership stake
of all shareholders to anyone. This would allow disgruntled shareholders to
easily contact other influential owners, while also providing information
about changes in insider holdings. On the other hand, this level of
transparency may introduce privacy concerns, and it is possible that any
golden ledger of shareholders might only be made visible to managerial
insiders. If this latter path is taken, then very interesting questions will arise
about the circumstances under which an outside shareholder (or other party)
should be able to access this data. 256
D. Corporate Liability and Shareholder Responsibility
Finally, the development of traceable shares might even allow
lawmakers to rethink fundamental principles of shareholder responsibility
for corporate misdeeds. To date, holding former shareholders directly
accountable for any corporate offenses that arose during their ownership
tenure has been exceedingly rare. 257 In light of the new information that
254

Indeed, I would predict that one implication of easier coordination among shareholders will be an
emphasis on the availability of proxy access for board elections.
255 See supra Section I.C.3.
256 In Delaware, it is likely that this information could be obtained under a shareholder books and
records request governed by Title 8 § 220 of the Delaware Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West
2006). But the constantly changing ledger of shareholders might raise new questions. For example, would
a firm have an ongoing obligation to provide current ownership updates to an outside shareholder for a
given period of time (as opposed to a static snapshot) if a proper purpose is established?
257 The primary exception, of course, is found in a claim to pierce the corporate veil. See, e.g., Robert
B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). These
lawsuits mostly arise in the context of tort or contract claims by outside parties against current
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traceable shares could offer, however, established notions of corporate and
shareholder liability might need to be reexamined. For instance, the ability
to trace shares could address the allocation of shareholder liability in the
context of 10b-5 fraud on the market claims. 258
One of the more important developments in corporate liability arose
when the Supreme Court accepted fraud on the market in connection with a
10b-5 misrepresentation claim. 259 Reaffirmed in 2014, 260 this doctrine allows
shareholders to sue for corporate misrepresentations in connection with a
trade, even when the investor did not hear the misleading statement. 261 The
premise is that plaintiffs should be able to rely on the integrity of the market
itself and the idea that prices will quickly react to the release of public
corporate misstatements. 262 As a practical matter, fraud on the market
facilitates class action securities litigation because plaintiff shareholders no
longer need to demonstrate common issues of individual reliance. 263
This theory has generated controversy. 264 One set of concerns arises
from the complex economic effects that can result from a judgment against
the firm. Consider an illustrative fact pattern: the head of investor relations
issues a press release stating that something really good has occurred—
perhaps the firm has struck oil in a remote location. The firm’s share price
leaps from $30 to $50 in response, but the statement is a total lie. One
shareholder, Albert, decides to sell 100 shares for unrelated reasons and
pockets the $5000. Another shareholder, Byron, doesn’t learn of the
statement, but he decides to buy the 100 shares for $5000. A third
shareholder, Constance, has owned 100 shares of the firm for years, and she
holds her stock throughout this time period. Several weeks later, with the
shares still trading at $50 per share, the lie is revealed, and the price falls
back to $30 per share. Byron files a 10b-5 action against the firm, alleging
fraud on the market.

shareholders; they do not typically involve shareholder lawsuits and transfers from former to current
shareholders, as discussed in this Section.
258 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
259 This took place in 1988 with Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–45 (1988). For a
contemporary assessment of the case and its impact, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059
(1990).
260 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014).
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 2412.
264 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011); Macey & Miller, supra note 259; Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 663 (1992).
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Byron seems to have a good case, under the theory that he paid too
much for the stock. True, he did not hear the false claim, or purchase his
stock in direct reliance on the statement, but fraud on the market should allow
Byron to win a lawsuit against the firm. He recovers $2000 (100 times $20),
reflecting the higher amount that he had to pay when the market price rose
in response to the firm’s lie. Economically, however, this money does not
materialize from thin air. The $2000 in damages is effectively borne by other
current shareholders, as residual claimants of the firm’s assets. If there are
1000 total shares, for instance, then each share should decline by $2 to reflect
the decrease in cash. This general phenomenon—and the fact that corporate
liability must ultimately be borne by residual owners who may have had
absolutely nothing to do with the firm’s misdeeds—is a perennial concern. 265
This problem becomes especially salient if we consider the plight of our
other individual investors. Constance owned shares worth $3000 at the time
of the lie. Her position briefly jumps to $5000 but then drops to $2800 after
the shares return to $30 per share when the lie is revealed, and then drop to
$28 per share when Byron wins and the damages are paid out by the firm.
Given that Constance was a shareholder when the shareholders elected the
firm directors, who in turn, appointed the rogue managers, a case might be
made for holding her responsible for the misdeeds of the insider managers
under a principal–agent relationship. Many people, however, would consider
her a victim of the agency cost problem; any culpability is highly attenuated.
Albert, on the other hand, should be delighted by this turn of events. He
was expecting to receive $3000, but when the stock price jumped to $50 per
share right before his liquidation, he was able to cash out at a much higher
price.
Historically, the law has never worried much about benefits to
shareholders like Albert. 266 Investors who benefit from corporate
misrepresentations—whether by selling too high in the presence of false
good news (like Albert) or by buying too low in the presence of false bad
news—are simply allowed to keep their profits. At least part of the reason
for this approach seems to come from an administrative inability to trace
shares. We might be able to determine, in a rough sense, the timing of when
someone changes their economic position, but no losing party could link
shares back to an individual gaining investor.
The presence of traceable shares, however, might conceivably change
the way that lawmakers think about corporate liability and shareholder
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See supra note 2.
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 264, at 93–94; Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 635 (1985).
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responsibility. Should we be willing to claw back the gains from Albert in
this example? Indeed, holding the benefitting investor responsible might
represent a classic case of restitution. 267 A full exploration of this possibility,
and the wisdom of invoking restitution doctrines in similar circumstances, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the example should begin to illustrate
how profound structural changes related to corporate and shareholder
responsibility will become possible with traceable shares.
CONCLUSION
Traceable shares may seem like a minor development for corporate law.
Indeed, many people probably assume that we already track individual
ownership histories. Yet this is not the case. New technology that creates
traceable shares would therefore represent a significant change and offer
some intriguing possibilities for improved corporate governance. Indeed, it
may even prompt lawmakers to reconsider fundamental notions of corporate
liability and shareholder responsibility.
More accurate stock clearing and settlement systems should also
influence scholarly debates about the optimal structure of corporate
governance. Many commentators continue to focus on the right way to
balance power between shareholders and managers. Shareholder rights
advocates push for reforms, like increased proxy access and disarmed
antitakeover defenses, to bolster shareholder power. Advocates of director
primacy continue to assert that shareholder activism brings strategic
ignorance and sows dysfunctional leadership teams. They insist that most
governance matters should be left to inside managers. Moderates see ills in
both extremes and work to design better checks and balances via corporate
law reforms. The availability of a more accurate system for tabulating votes
and parsing out other legal rights might cause some scholars to reconsider
their positions.
Moreover, all commentators should agree on one principle: a wellfunctioning system of corporate voting is critical to any healthy governance
regime. Proponents of shareholder democracy cannot argue for greater
participation rights if the legitimacy of resulting tallies is suspect. And those
who advocate for board deference do so on the bedrock of authority that
reliable shareholder elections supposedly confer. The proper scope of
267 The law of restitution seeks to avoid unjust results under the general principle that “unjust
enrichment must be disgorged.” See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989). According to Laycock, this body of law “consists largely of blank spaces
with undefined borders and only scattered patches of familiar ground.” Id. at 1277. Restitution might
therefore provide an intriguing remedy to recoup “undeserved” benefits from ex-shareholders, but the
theory would require more extended analysis.
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governance power is subject to debate and centers on disagreements about
managerial agency costs and shareholder information deficits. What matters
to everyone, however, is the fitness of the underlying system used to stuff
the ballot boxes. Traceable shares cannot put these longstanding corporate
governance debates to rest, but they will open an important new chapter for
corporate law.
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